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A JURISPRUDENCE OF DANGEROUSNESS
Christopher Slobogin"
INTRODUCTION
Leroy Hendricks is on the verge of release from prison after serving his fifth
sentence for child molestation. He candidly tells his court-appointed evalua-
tors that, if released, the only sure way he will stop molesting children is "to
die."'
Garry David, diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder, is nearing the
end of his 14-year sentence for shooting a woman and two police officers,
conduct that occurred just after being released from prison for a previous vio-
lent offense. While in prison, he assaulted more than 15 inmates and guards,
conduct which increased his sentence. A court found that, if released, "[h]is
underlying anger and resentment would be almost certain to rise to an explo-
sive level as soon as he felt thwarted or subjected to stress.",2
Zacarias Moussaoui, a French-Moroccan known to have trained in Osama bin
Laden's camps in Afghanistan, tried to pay $8,000 for flying lessons prior to
September 11, 2001, stating that he was only interested in learning how to
handle an aircraft (not take-off or land). He also made several telephone calls
to some of the individuals eventually involved in the hijackings of September
11 th, although the contents of those calls are not known.3
Dangerousness determinations permeate the government's implementation
of its police power. To name a few examples, death penalty determinations,
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
For their comments on this Article, the author would like to thank Wayne Logan, John Monahan, Doug-
las Mossman, Michael Perlin, and participants in workshops at the University of California, Hastings
and the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
I Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997).
2 The Garry David case is described in C. Robert Williams, Psychopathy, Mental Illness and Pre-
ventive Detention: Issues Arising from the David Case, 16 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 161, 162, 170-78
(1990). Out of concern that, if released, David would go on another violent crime spree aimed particu-
larly at police, the Parliament of Victoria took the extraordinary step of passing special legislation (eu-
phemistically called the "Community Protection Act of 1990"), the sole purpose of which was to
authorize prevention detention of David after his release from prison. Id. at 175-76.
3 Vivienne Walt, French Investigator Tackles Terrorism's "Cancer," USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2001, at
I IA.
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non-capital sentencing, sexual predator commitment, civil commitment,
pretrial detention, and investigative stops by the police often or always de-
pend upon dangerousness assessments.' This Article examines the legiti-
macy of these interventions, which all result in some form of preventive
detention.
The best place to start is with an analysis of long-term, "pure" preven-
tive detention. Pure preventive detention is defined in this Article as a dep-
rivation of liberty that is based on a prediction of harmful conduct and that
is not time-limited by culpability or other considerations (such as a pending
trial). Under traditional theory, only people with serious mental illness may
be subjected to long-term pure preventive detention.' Under traditional the-
ory, therefore, none of the three individuals described above could be de-
tained unless the government charged them with some (new) crime.6
Hendricks, David, and even Moussaoui may have diagnosable mental dis-
orders, but not disorders that support preventive commitment as classically
conceived.'
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has undermined this traditional
view regarding pure preventive detention, but the extent to which it has
done so is not clear. In Kansas v. Hendricks,8 involving the constitutional-
ity of a so-called "sexual predator" statute, the Court permitted indetermi-
nate confinement of dangerous individuals who have completed their
sentences and have committed no new crime even when they are not seri-
4 For a description of the many contexts in which dangerousness determinations play a role in the
criminal process, see Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in
LAW, MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL DISORDER 360-63 (Bruce Sales & Daniel Shuman eds., 1996).
5 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (White, J., writing for a plurality of the Court)
(holding invalid the continued commitment of a dangerous person who had been found not guilty by
reason of insanity but who was now no longer mentally ill and stating that the state's position
"would... be only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present system
which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incar-
cerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law"); see also
Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1229-33
(1974) (noting that "unlike other members of society, the mentally ill maybe incarcerated for the protec-
tion of the community because of their potential for doing harm rather than because of the harm which
they have caused" and discussing the possible rationales for this differential treatment).
6 Moussaoui is charged with conspiracy, although the basis for this charge is somewhat vague.
Viveca Novak, How the Moussaoui Case Crumbled, TIME, Oct. 27, 2003, at 33, 35 (reporting that, while
the original indictment against Moussaoui recounted behavior that paralleled that of the 9/11 perpetra-
tors, "direct contact" between them and Moussaoui "was never alleged," and indicating that, if the case
proceeds, reference to 9/11 may have to be dropped).
7 In Hendricks, the Kansas Supreme Court found that Hendricks was not committable under tradi-
tional standards. Matter of Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996) ("[N]either
the language of the Act nor the State's evidence supports a finding that 'mental abnormality or personal-
ity disorder' as used in [the sexual predator law] is a 'mental illness' as defined in [the Kansas civil
commitment statute]."). Likewise, David was not eligible for traditional commitment. See Williams,
supra note 2, at 172-74 (describing the "amendment" of the Victorian Mental Health Act's definition of
"mental illness" to include anti-social personality disorder and thus ensure David's detention).
8 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
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ously mentally disordered-as long as they have a personality disorder that
renders them unable to adequately control their anti-social conduct. 9 The
Court recently affirmed its willingness to uphold the institutionalization of
non-psychotic people who meet this "inability-to-control" threshold in Kan-
sas v. Crane."t These holdings are clearly meant to permit the preventive
detention of people like Hendricks, whose commitment was affirmed by the
Court." Whether they would authorize preventive detention of someone
like David, who may not exhibit the type of inability to control that is popu-
larly associated with sex offenders, remains an open question, and pure pre-
ventive detention of someone like Moussaoui is undoubtedly not authorized
by the Court's case law to date. 2
Despite the relatively limited reach of the statute upheld in Hendricks,
the Court's opinion occasioned a storm of criticism. The attacks on
Hendricks focus on two aspects of that decision, which I will call the psy-
chological criterion and the prediction criterion. The psychological crite-
rion describes the psychological traits that distinguish those dangerous
people who may be committed from those who may not be. The prediction
criterion describes the level of risk that must be shown before preventive
detention may take place. The first criticism of Hendricks inveighs against
its endorsement of the inability-to-control notion as the appropriate psycho-
logical criterion for preventive detention. Those who voice this criticism
argue instead for some version of the traditional view that only serious
mental dysfunction (i.e., psychosis or irrationality) permits confinement
based on dangerousness. The second criticism concerns the Court's belief,
implicit in Hendricks and explicit in other cases, that enough evidence can
be procured to meet the prediction criterion. 4 Critics of this stripe contend
that predicting which individuals will offend with a level of certainty suffi-
cient to justify long-term confinement is impossible, or only possible in a
small percentage of cases, and thus invalid detentions and abuse are likely. 5
Much of this Article is devoted to assessing the claims and counter-
claims made about the psychological and prediction criteria for preventive
9 Id. at 356-58.
10 434 U.S. 407,411-13 (2002).
11 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 143-50.
13 See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
14 Although Hendricks did not directly address this issue, it implicitly endorsed commitments based
on such predictions. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58, 371. Other Supreme Court decisions have
made clear that dangerousness predictions, whether made by experts or laypeople, may form the basis
for deprivations of liberty. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (upholding dangerous-
ness as an aggravating factor supporting the death penalty, largely on the ground that "prediction of fu-
ture criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal
justice system"); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) ("[F]rom a legal point of view there is noth-
ing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.").
15 See infra text accompanying notes 212-13.
98:1 (2003)
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detention. It concludes that both Hendricks and its critics are wrong about
the appropriate psychological criterion, but that Hendricks is closer to get-
ting it right than those who believe preventive detention should be reserved
for people who suffer from psychosis or similarly severe mental disorders.
It also concludes that the controversy over the prediction criterion requires
significant rethinking.
More specifically, with respect to the psychological criterion, I argue
that the core trait that normatively distinguishes the dangerous person who
may be preventively detained from the dangerous person who may not be is
imperviousness to criminal punishment, or what I shall call undeterrability.
This condition clearly describes the severely mentally ill person who is
oblivious to societal mores or who is irrationally convinced that his criminal
actions do not violate them. But it might also describe the extremely im-
pulsive individual who, like Hendricks or David, is willing to commit crime
despite a very high likelihood of apprehension. It may even apply to some-
one like Moussaoui, who suffers from neither a major mental disorder nor a
volitional dysfunction, but who wants to commit crime so badly he -is will-
ing to die for it. 6 When the dangerous person is undeterrable in this sense,
society is presumptively entitled to impose preventive detention rather than
or in addition to punishment, because then the commands of the criminal
justice system not only do not work (a state of affairs presumably descrip-
tive of almost every criminal act), they cannot work.
This Article also assesses the prediction criterion: the degree of dan-
gerousness necessary to justify preventive detention. 7 The debate on this
issue between those who emphasize individual liberty and those who focus
on public security has been vigorous, but the two sides often seem to be
talking past one another, given their starting points. I do not try to define
the prediction criterion precisely, but I do propose two principles on which
both sides should be able to agree. The proportionality principle requires
that the degree of danger be roughly proportionate to the proposed govern-
ment intervention. Thus, for instance, greater proof of dangerousness is
needed to impose the death penalty than to conduct a law enforcement frisk.
A further, less obvious consequence of the proportionality idea is that pre-
ventive detention would be subject to durational limitations, because the
longer the government seeks to detain someone preventively, the more
proof of dangerousness it would need to produce. The consistency princi-
ple requires that the prediction criterion applied in the preventive detention
context be consistent with analogous manifestations of the government's
police power, in particular the implementation of criminal justice. Thus, for
16 See infra text accompanying notes 200-03.
17 1 address elsewhere the equally important questions of whether we can prove dangerousness with
the requisite level of certainty, see Slobogin, supra note 4, at 372-79, and how we might do so, see
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984); see also infra notes
35-36.
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instance, the degree of dangerousness required for incarcerative preventive
detention ought to be roughly equivalent to the degree of dangerousness
that permits conviction for inchoate crimes such as conspiracy, reckless en-
dangerment, and driving while intoxicated, because both preventive deten-
tion and these provisions of criminal law authorize significant deprivations
of liberty to protect third parties.
As this last comment suggests, application of the proportionality and
consistency principles could have significant implications for both preven-
tive detention and the law of crimes. Under these two principles, one could
argue that preventive detention based on dangerousness could, at least ini-
tially, be justified on a relatively low risk of harm (such as that associated
with the crime of driving while intoxicated). Conversely, with some of the
most inchoate crimes, such as vagrancy and possession of certain types of
contraband, confinement may not be justifiable under any reasonable
interpretation of these principles, because the degree of danger posed by
such crimes is so minimal.
This Article develops the psychological and prediction criteria in more
detail, as well as their implications for the criminal law. Before doing so,
however, it explores at length a fundamental predicate issue. Assuming the
prediction criterion is met, why should society want to impose any addi-
tional limitations on the government's authority to incapacitate dangerous
individuals? Certainly a primary function of government is to prevent harm
to its citizens, and laws that incapacitate individuals simply upon evidence
that they are likely to cause such harm would seem to be one effective man-
ner of doing so. An explication of why that development should not occur
is necessary to set the stage for the rest of the Article.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article discusses the plausibility of a pre-
ventive detention regime that jettisons the psychological criterion require-
ment and instead focuses solely on the prediction criterion. It first
concludes that the standard objections to preventive detention-that we
cannot predict the future, that preventive detention is an underhanded way
of more easily imposing punishment, or that it violates the legality principle
because of definitional conundrums-are all rebuttable. But it also con-
cludes that such a regime would violate the fundamental tenet, derivable
from deontological, utilitarian, and ethical reasoning, that autonomous indi-
viduals who commit criminal acts have a right to punishment. If govern-
ment chooses to preventively detain an individual rather than punish him, it
must show the person is not eligible for the right to punishment. Thus,
government must demonstrate not only dangerousness, but also that the per-
son is so lacking in the capacity or willingness to adhere to society's most
basic prohibitions-in other words, so undeterrable-that punishment is not
warranted. Although I recognize an effect exception to this proposition-
which would permit preventive actions in the absence of psychological im-
pairment if they are consistent with the right to punishment-sound policy
98:1 (2003)
HeinOnline  -- 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 5 2003-2004
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
reasons support a prohibition on long-term deprivations of liberty based on
dangerousness, unless the psychological criterion is also met.
On that assumption, Part II explores the possible alternatives to the
psychological limitation and makes the case for undeterrability as the ap-
propriate inquiry. Part III then examines the prediction criterion, and more
fully describes the proportionality and consistency principles. Finally, Part
IV briefly sets out the implications of these criteria for the criminal law, and
in particular the law of inchoate and anticipatory offenses. My goal is to
describe and justify a jurisprudence of dangerousness governing the state's
implementation of its police power.
I. DANGEROUSNESS AS THE SOLE CRITERION FOR STATE INTERVENTION
Sex offenders are not the only criminals who might routinely recidi-
vate. Burglars, check forgers, and even killers can be repeat offenders.
Certainly the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from
these types of crimes. Why shouldn't the state be empowered to take pre-
ventive action against any individual who is likely to wreak havoc on soci-
ety?
There are at least four objections to such a preventive regime. The un-
reliability objection is that we lack the tools to predict criminal behavior
with a sufficient degree of certainty. The punishment-in-disguise objection
is that a preventive detention regime will allow government to avoid the
rigorous procedural protections of the criminal law and perhaps eventually
replace criminal justice altogether. The legality objection is that we cannot
define the state's power to detain for preventive reasons sufficiently pre-
cisely to provide notice and avoid official abuse. The dehumanization ob-
jection is that deprivations of liberty based on future behavior offend basic
precepts of our civilization.
Each one of these objections suggests limitations on preventive deten-
tion. None of them, however, requires prohibition of such detention under
all circumstances. The following discussion elaborates on these conclu-
sions.
A. The Unreliability Objection
This objection to preventive detention rests on two assumptions. First,
government should not be able to deprive a person of liberty on dangerous-
ness grounds unless it demonstrates a high degree of certainty that the per-
son will offend in the near future. Second, such proof is impossible to
obtain.
The first assumption expresses a preference for certainty that is analo-
gous to the criminal law requirement that the government prove the essen-
tial elements of crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a preference is
understandable, but it is misguided for three reasons. First, imposition of
the reasonable doubt standard is overly stringent when the state's goal is to
HeinOnline  -- 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 6 2003-2004
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prevent rather than to punish. Second, the belief that the criminal law per-
mits conviction only when there is no reasonable doubt about blameworthi-
ness is based on a misconception about the reliability of assessments made
in criminal cases; in fact, the culpability determinations that provide the
primary basis for criminal punishment are subject to serious inaccuracy.
Third, requiring a high degree of danger is inconsistent with the fact that
many of the crimes that penalize dangerous activity require very little in the
way of predictive validity. Each of these propositions is discussed further
below.
The preference for establishing guil*t beyond a reasonable doubt in
criminal trials is often expressed through the adage that our system would
prefer to let ten guilty people go free than permit one innocent person to be
convicted. But assume that six of these hypothetical ten guilty individuals
will commit a crime if not confined. Michael Corrado has pointed out the
different calculus that exists when the state seeks to prevent rather than
convict. The outcome of a crime cannot be changed; in the latter context, as
he states, "[t]he only dangers are those of convicting an innocent person, on
the one side, [and] ... of letting a guilty person off without his proper pun-
ishment."' 8 In contrast, if we could identify a group of ten people, among
whom six will kill in the near future, "surely the likelihood that four will
lose their freedom must be weighed against the likelihood that six will lose
their lives."' 9 Despite the fact that we can reasonably doubt whether any
particular person in this group will commit homicide, preventive detention
of the entire group may well be justified given the cost of not doing so.2"
In any event, the belief that the reasonable doubt standard demands
more than this level of certainty is badly mistaken. Every criminal law pro-
fessor knows the difficulty of differentiating premeditation from ordinary
intent, or recklessness from negligence. Even if agreement can be reached
as to the precise definition of these concepts, independent judges and juries
applying them are bound to arrive at different results on the same facts; for
instance, disagreement is highly likely in deciding between first and sec-
ond-degree murder, unprovoked and provoked killing, and voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter.2' These disparities are an inevitable aspect of a
Is Michael J. Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Deten-
tion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 793 (1996). A similar type of analysis may justify permitting
stop and frisks on lesser suspicion than is normally required for a search. Professor Sundby has argued
that the reason this police investigative technique requires only reasonable suspicion (as opposed to
probable cause) is because it is aimed at prevention of danger. See Scott Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief ofCamara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 423-25 (1988).
19 Corrado, supra note 18, at 794.
20 For more on this line of reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 227-29.
2! Not surprisingly, empirical research indicates that lay views on the culpability of specific crimi-
nals vary enormously. See, e.g., PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 226 (1995) (noting that, in 20 percent of the scenarios that
subjects were asked to rate in terms of culpability, the standard deviation on culpability ratings exceeded
3.50, a number suggesting extremely low agreement); NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE:
98:1 (2003)
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system that relies on moral judgments about invisible, internal mental
states.22
In social science terms, this high degree of inter-rater inconsistency (or
unreliability) cannot help but indicate a high degree of inaccuracy (or inva-
lidity) as well.23 The assertion that we can know, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a person "deserves" a particular verdict and punishment ex-
presses a hope rather than a reality. And the costs of inaccuracy are huge-
a finding of premeditation can result in the death penalty rather than a 20-
year sentence; a conclusion that a defendant's belief was "unreasonable"
can mean the difference between conviction and acquittal. If we are willing
to countenance a criminal system based on this degree of uncertainty, we
may be hard-pressed to criticize a preventive detention regime on unreli-
ability grounds.
The final reason a high level of certainty may not be necessary in the
preventive context rests on the assertion that, when the criminal law pun-
ishes conduct because it is dangerous, the degree of danger required is often
minimal, especially with respect to crimes such as reckless endangerment,
possession, and vagrancy. In other words, as developed in more detail in
Part III of this Article,24 a requirement that predictions of anti-social con-
duct meet the reasonable doubt standard in the preventive detention context
would be, in effect, a more rigorous proof standard than is often found in
JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 134, 166, 248 tbl.13.1, 252 tbl.13.2 (finding significant disagreement
among study subjects on scenarios involving mens rea, felony murder and self-defense); HARRY
KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 & tbl.l1 (1971) (finding disagreement between
judges and juries sitting on the same criminal case in 24.6 percent of the cases studied). In fall 2001, I
gave nine six-person "juries," composed of students in my criminal law class (who had all studied homi-
cide law), the facts of People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968), involving the grisly murder of a
10-year-old girl. Five out of the nine juries convicted Anderson of first-degree murder (the verdict at the
trial court level), three convicted him of second-degree murder (the resolution of the California Supreme
Court), and two were hung, but leaned toward manslaughter. In another study, the same nine juries were
asked to sentence Leroy Hendricks without considering his dangerousness or rehabilitative potential.
They split evenly between 10 to 15 years, 15 to 25 years, and 25 years to life.
22 Cf Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976) ("The concept of mens rea involves what is
ultimately the fiction of determining the actual thoughts or mental processes of the accused. It is obvi-
ous that a certain resolution of this issue is beyond the ken of scientist and laymen alike."); Mark Fon-
dacaro, Toward an Ecological Jurisprudence Rooted in Concepts of Justice and Empirical Research, 69
UMKC L. REV. 179, 187 (2000) ("[T]he difficulties of substantiating with empirical evidence such fine-
grained conceptual distinctions [e.g., between premeditation and recklessness] is plainly apparent to re-
search-oriented behavioral scientists."). Even staunch advocates of retributivism recognize this point.
Jeffrie Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions, and the "Clumsy Moral Philosophy" of
Jesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 149, 157 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999) (noting that it is hard to
know another's mind, much less whether they acted from a "hardened, abandoned and malignant
heart"). I have tried to explicate why accurate information about past mental states is so difficult to
come by in Christopher Slobogin, Doubts about Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case Study, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 927-32 (2000).
23 On reliability and validity, see JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW
54-55 (4th ed. 1998).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 240-55.
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the criminal context. This observation does not necessarily justify govern-
ment intervention based on low degrees of danger. It does suggest, how-
ever, that a regime that permitted various sorts of preventive action against
low risk individuals would be consistent with our current law of crimes.
Even if a "real" reasonable doubt standard must be met when making
predictions of danger, the U.S. Supreme Court is unwilling to accept the as-
sertion that this high level of proof is impossible to meet, a position which
substantially undermines the second (impossibility-of-proof) assumption
underlying the unreliability objection. In Jurek v. Texas 5 the Court held
that the death penalty-which to be valid requires proof of an aggravating
circumstance, presumably beyond a reasonable doubt2 6-may be based on
predictions of future violence.27 In Barefoot v. Estelle,"5 it reaffirmed this
position and indicated that even if such predictions are wrong more often
than they are right, the adversarial process can be counted upon to expose
erroneous views.29 If executions may be based on evidence acknowledged
to be this potentially flimsy, presumably preventive detention may be as
well.
Although the Court's views on this issue have justly been attacked, ° its
apparent confidence in our ability to predict is not completely misplaced.
Due to a number of methodological difficulties in measuring prediction va-
lidity, we may never know precisely how accurate the various modes of
prediction are.' But we can say that prediction science-in particular,
methods that utilize actuarial tables or structured interviews-has improved
to the point where clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness, if not
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is available for certain categories of indi-
viduals.32 If, as Part III discusses in more detail,33 the level of proof neces-
25 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976).
26 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876 (1982).
27 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275-76 (holding that jury prediction of future violence is "no different from
the task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice").
28 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
29 Id. at 901 (asserting that the adversary system can be trusted to differentiate credible from in-
credible evidence, "at least as of now").
30 See generally Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant,
Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Bare-
foot's Achilles Heel, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 91, 108-21 (1985); Slobogin, supra note 17, at 146
("[T]he state should not be allowed to introduce dangerousness testimony unopposed by a defense ex-
pert unless it can show that the testimony proffered possesses a high degree of validity.").
31 The difficulties include obtaining complete information about the extent of anti-social activity af-
ter predictions are made, and the associated fact that a prediction of dangerousness virtually always re-
sults in incapacitation, treatment, or both, making follow-up data about recidivism ambiguous. See
generally JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 52-60 (1981).
32 See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF
VIOLENCE AND DISORDER 127 (2001) (describing a technique "[u]sing only risk factors commonly
available in hospital records or capable of being routinely assessed in clinical practice" which placed
individuals into "five risk classes for which the prevalence of violence during the first 20 weeks follow-
ing discharge into the community varied between 1% and 76%"); VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT
98:1 (2003)
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sary to justify exercise of the state's police power need not reach the rea-
sonable doubt level for some types of detention, then our capacity to make
legally valid predictions increases significantly.34
The unreliability objection, in short, does not dictate a prohibition on
preventive detention. Juxtaposition of preventive detention with the other
liberty-depriving manifestation of the police power-the criminal law-
suggests several reasons why the threshold necessary to support such deten-
tion need not be set at the reasonable doubt level, and that whatever quan-
tum of proof is required, courts assume it can be met, an assumption that
current research tends to support for at least some types of individuals. On
the other hand, the unreliability objection does counsel caution when mak-
ing predictions of anti-social behavior. Only the best prediction methods
should be used,35 and perhaps other adjustments should be made to compen-
OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 148-51 & fig. 8.1 (1998) (discussing the ability of the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) to identify groups of offenders with a 55 percent, 75 percent
and 95 percent likelihood of recidivism); Grant T. Harris et al., Prospective Replication of the Violence
Risk Appraisal Guide in Predicting Violent Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 377 (2002) (a prospective study using the VRAG that accurately identified clusters of patients
with a 71 percent and 100 percent recidivism rate); William Gardner et al., A Comparison of Actuarial
Methods for Identifying Repetitively Violent Patients with Mental Illness, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 35,
41-42 (1996) (describing a "regression tree" that identified a small group of patients-3 percent of the
sample population-who committed violent acts at the rate of 2.75 incidents per month); Mamie E. Rice
et al., An Evaluation of a Maximum Security Therapeutic Community for Psychopaths and Other Men-
tally Disordered Offenders, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 399 (1992) (reporting that 77 percent of those who
scored higher than 25 on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised committed a violent offense despite treat-
ment); Jay Apperson et al., Short-Term Clinical Prediction of Assaultive Behavior: Artifacts of Re-
search Methods, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1374 (1993) (reporting a 25 percent false positive rate);
Thomas Litwack & Louis Schlesinger, Assessing and Predicting Violence: Research, Law, and Appli-
cations, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 205, 224 (Irving Weiner & G. Hess eds., 1987) (as-
serting that "clear and convincing evidence" of future violence exists if there is (1) a recent history of
repeated violence; (2) a more distant history of violence together with evidence that the complex of traits
that led to violence still exist and the circumstances that led to past violence will reoccur; or (3) an un-
equivocal threat or other like evidence of serious intentions to commit violence).
33 See infra text accompanying notes 240-55.
34 A number of different predictive techniques have yielded false positive rates between 30 percent
and 50 percent. See, e.g., Charles Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269
JAMA 1007 (1993) (47 percent false positive rate); Deidre Klassen & William O'Connor, A Prospective
Study of Predictors of Violence in Adult Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143
(1988) (40 percent false positive rate); Diana Sepejak et al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness Two
Year Follow-Up of 408 Pre-Trial Forensic Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983)
(44 percent false positive rate).
35 The single most important advance in this regard might be a requirement that courts consider ac-
tuarial information in combination with "structured" clinical risk assessment. See, e.g., GARY MELTON
ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 290-92 (2d ed. 1997) (advocating an "anamnestic" approach that uses
actuarial data as a baseline and clinical assessment as a method of individualizing predictions); Kevin S.
Douglas et al., Evaluation of a Model of Violence Risk Assessment Among Forensic Psychiatric Pa-
tients, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1372 (2003) (finding that "structured" clinical decisionmaking im-
proved on pure actuarial prediction).
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sate for the inevitably speculative nature of prediction.36 For the remainder
of this Article, I will assume that, under such conditions, dangerousness can
be proven with the requisite degree of certainty. That assumption allows
focus on the conceptual objections to preventive detention.
B. The Punishment-in-Disguise Objection
In Allen v. Illinois,37 the Supreme Court presaged Hendricks by holding
that proceedings under a statute that permits "commitment" of sex offenders
in lieu of criminal prosecution do not implicate the privilege against self-
incrimination, because such hearings are not "criminal" in nature and thus
do not involve incrimination.38 Similarly, in Hendricks, the Court held that
because such special track sex offender proceedings are not "punitive" in
intent, post-sentence commitment of sex offenders does not violate the dou-
ble jeopardy clause's ban on multiple punishments for the "same offense."39
Such reasoning might also permit courts to declare that the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantees of counsel, public jury trial, and confrontation during
"criminal prosecutions" do not apply in such proceedings.4"
In his dissent in Allen, Justice Stevens expressed concern that the
Court's willingness to label preventive detention laws "civil" rather than
"criminal" would encourage a proliferation of such statutes.41 Eventually,
he speculated, a shadow criminal code could develop that would give
prosecutors the discretion to detain preventively a wide array of dangerous
36 1 have argued that, given its relatively weak probative value and its prejudicial nature, clinical
prediction testimony should not be admissible on behalf of the state unless the defendant decides to rely
on it as well. Slobogin, supra note 17, at 148-49. Many authors have made other suggestions, ranging
from the manner in which prediction evaluations should be conducted to the way in which prediction
information is communicated to the fact finder. See generally R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know
About Sex Offender Risk Assessment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 50, 67 (1998) (describing three ap-
proaches to risk assessment: the "empirically guided clinical approach, the pure actuarial approach, and
the adjusted actuarial approach"); Donald G. MacGregor et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk
Communication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability
Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000) (exploring "probability," "frequency,"
and "categorical" methods of communicating risk). The requirement, which I argue derives from the
legality principle, that only people who have committed a crime or obviously risky conduct should be
subject to preventive intervention, see infra text accompanying notes 87-117, might further improve the
accuracy of prediction and would at least limit those cases in which speculation occurs.
37 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
38 Id. at 370.
39 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
40 Cf Markey v. Wachtel, 264 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1979) (no right to jury at civil commitment hear-
ing); Ted McGraw et al., Civil Commitment in New York City: An Analysis of Practice, 5 PACE L. REV.
259, 290-91 (1985) (commitment courts routinely allow hearsay testimony that would probably be pro-
hibited in a criminal case on right-to-confrontation grounds).
41 478 U.S. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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offenders.42 In his eyes, this alternative code would lead to "evisceration of
the criminal law and its accompanying protections."43
To date, Justice Stevens's prediction that government will routinely
use preventive detention laws to evade the strictures of the criminal law has
not come to pass. After Hendricks gave the green light to full scale, post-
sentence preventive detention for sex offenders, the legislative enthusiasm
for such schemes rose momentarily but has since abated,' and prosecutors
in most states with such laws have not rushed to abandon the criminal proc-
ess in favor of "easier" petitions for commitment.45 In any event, were such
a movement to develop, preventive detention would not thereby be rendered
illegitimate, for the Court is right that preventive detention, properly struc-
tured, is not criminal punishment.
Much has been written about the criminal-civil distinction.46  That lit-
erature will not be rehearsed here. The strongest argument in favor of the
Court's position can be expressed through a simple syllogism. Criminal
punishment is based solely upon a conviction for an offense and can occur
only if there is such a conviction. Preventive detention is based solely upon
a prediction concerning future offenses and can occur only if there is such a
prediction. Therefore, preventive detention is not criminal punishment. In-
deed, the concept of "punishment" for some future act is incoherent.4 Ac-
cordingly, to the extent procedural protections depend upon characterization
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 W. Lawrence Fitch & Debra A. Hammen, The New Generation of Sex Offender Commitment
Laws: Which States Have Them and How Do They Work?, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 27, 33 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds., 2003) (table showing that,
while approximately ten states passed sexual predator laws between 1997 and 1999, no state has done so
since then).
45 Id. at 32 (noting that in California, prosecutors are bringing approximately 750 petitions each
year and in Florida there were over 9,000 petitions in the first two years of the statute's existence; how-
ever, as of fall 2001, in the nine states whose post-Hendricks sexual predator laws had gone into effect
by then, including California and Florida, only 473 individuals had been committed, with the average
commitment rate per state amounting to roughly fifteen to twenty annually); see also John Q. LaFond,
The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 468, 492 (1998) ("Though it
is too early to tell with certainty, it is likely that in the not-too-distant future, these sexual predator laws
will be used less frequently," given the higher sentences being meted out to sex offenders).
46 Relatively recently two journals have devoted entire issues to the subject. See The Civil-Criminal
Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES, No. 1 (1996) and Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and Crimi-
nal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (symposium covers issues nos. I & 2).
47 Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Jus-
tice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) ("[l]t is impossible to 'punish dangerous-
ness.' ... [Plunishment can only exist in relation to a past wrong."); see also Christopher Slobogin &
Mark Fondacaro, Rethinking Deprivations of Liberty: Possible Contributions from Therapeutic and
Ecological Jurisprudence, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 499, 504 n.24 (2000) ("Punishment is a reaction to a
past act, not an attempt to prevent a future one.").
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of a proceeding as criminal, they are not required in preventive detention
proceedings.48
If a liberty deprivation pursuant to a prediction fails to adhere to the
logic of preventive detention, however, then it can become punishment.
The Supreme Court recognized as much in Jackson v. Indiana,49 when it de-
clared, "due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed."5 In Jackson, that principle mandated that the duration of the
government's authority to commit an individual who has been found in-
competent to stand trial be limited to that period reasonably necessary to re-
store him to competency or to determine that he is unrestorable.5 In the
preventive detention context, the reasonable relation principle requires that
the commitment match the state's interest in preventing harm.
That general limitation suggests three specific restrictions on preven-
tive detention. First, the duration of the commitment must be reasonably
related to the prevention of the harm predicted. This restriction requires re-
lease once the individual no longer presents the level of danger necessary
for preventive detention. A mental hospital must discharge the mentally ill
person who is "cured"; a police officer must release a person subject to in-
vestigative detention if no further suspicion develops during questioning.
Just as importantly, the duration limitation requires the state to provide
treatment that will reduce dangerousness.52 The Supreme Court, although
48 It is worth noting, however, that the due process clause still applies to any system that deprives
people of liberty. Case law in the civil commitment context has established that the due process clause
guarantees a number of rights at such proceedings, including the right to notice, counsel, confrontation,
and, in some jurisdictions, public jury trial. See generally MICHAEL PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 322-41, 353-58 (2d ed. 1998). Many have noted that these rights are not always
implemented. See, e.g., Serena Stier & Kurt Stoebe, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in
Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1284 (1979) (finding that, despite reforms
importing criminal process rights into commitment hearings, the process was non-adversarial in nature).
But it should be recognized that this phenomenon is primarily due to the low visibility of civil commit-
ment proceedings. When the stakes at the prevention detention proceeding are higher, as they are in
sexual predator proceedings, these rights are vigorously exercised, see LaFond, supra note 45, at 485
(comparing such proceedings to death penalty trials), just as, in the criminal system, constitutional rights
tend to become more important in more serious cases. See generally Maureen Mileski, Courtroom En-
counters: An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAW & Soc'y REV. 473, 484-85 (1971)
(describing the procedural informality of misdemeanor courts).
49 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
50 Id. at 738.
51 Id.
52 This is not to say that the state must prove an individual is treatable before he may be preventively
confined. As Hendricks stated, "incapacitation may be a legitimate end of the civil law... we have never
held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available,
but who nevertheless pose a danger to others." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997). The issue
is probably moot in any event, because even the most incorrigible offenders are in some sense "treatable."
See PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 359-462 (Theodore Millon et al.
eds., 1998) (containing six articles from different authors relying on different therapeutic perspectives that
acknowledge the difficulty of treating psychopathy and other "untreatable" patients, but nonetheless indi-
98:1 (2003)
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reticent about announcing a full-blown right to treatment in this setting, has
held that a committed person's "liberty interests require the State to provide
minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure... freedom from un-
due restraint."53 It has also continued to recognize the viability of a due
process claim against preventive detention that does not offer treatment.5 4
These decisions should be read to confirm that confinement of a treatable
individual without providing treatment is unreasonably prolonging deten-
tion, in violation of Jackson.5
The second essential feature of preventive detention-or what might
more aptly be called preventive intervention-is that the nature of the lib-
erty deprivation must bear a reasonable relationship to the harm feared.
While confinement may be necessary to prevent some individuals from
causing harm, conditional release and other less restrictive mechanisms can
also be effective at realizing that goal, especially after a period of treat-
ment. 6 Most commitment systems provide for alternatives to institutionali-
cate that it can be done). By the same token, proof of treatability should not somehow ease the state's bur-
den in proving the other requisites for preventive detention, contrary to Justice O'Connor's insinuation in
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that if there were some
"medical justification" for doing so, preventive detention of dangerous and sane individuals should be per-
missible). I discuss the latter issue more fully in Slobogin, supra note 4, at 369-70.
53 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
54 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (rejecting claim that sexual predator statute as applied
to petitioner was not "civil," but recognizing that a Jackson due process claim might lie if conditions of
confinement do not bear a reasonable relationship to the reasons for confinement and noting that the
statute provided for confinement and treatment).
55 As my co-authors and I argue elsewhere, the above quoted language in Youngberg "could easily
be parlayed into a robust right to treatment necessary to reduce prolonged confinement." Christopher
Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Chil-
dren, 1999 Wisc. L. REV. 185, 213; see also Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process
and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 319, 358-59 (2003)
(arguing that Youngberg "embodies... the police power right to treatment" and also arguing that "a
strong right to treatment can be derived from the Jackson principle that the duration of confinement
must be reasonably related to the purposes of confinement"); Note, The Supreme Court: 1981 Term, 96
HARV. L. REV. 62, 84 (1982) ("[T]he Court's reasoning [in Youngberg] implies the existence of expan-
sive rights that protect the patient's principal liberty interest-the interest in release from involuntary
confinement.... [T]be majority's liberty-based rationale suggests that mental patients have a constitu-
tional right to habilitative rather than merely protective treatment."). For supportive cases, see Wyatt v.
Rogers, 985 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that state was continuing to violate due process by
treating patients in overly restrictive conditions); Cameron v. Tomes, 783 F. Supp. 1511, 1526 (D. Mass.
1992) (holding that Youngberg requires the state to ensure professional assessment of sex offender's ac-
cess to community programs); Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 794 F.2d 79 (3d
Cir.) (finding Youngberg and substantive due process violated when patient was deprived of training in
community living despite professional judgment that she should be released from the institution).
56 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rogers et al., After Oregon's Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Conditional Release
and Hospitalization, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391 (1982) (describing a post-insanity acquittal commitment
system that relies on a multi-disciplinary board to implement treatment plans using conditional release and
close monitoring, and reporting a recidivism rate of only 6 percent); W.L. Marshall et al., A Three-Tiered Ap-
proach to the Rehabilitation of Incarcerated Sex Offenders, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 441 (1993) (describing a
model criminal justice-based program that could easily be implemented as preventive detention).
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zation." If, however, the paucity of such alternatives results in incarcera-
tion of those who do not need to be confined, the detention becomes puni-
tive, a position the Supreme Court has tangentially recognized." As
Professor Kahan has demonstrated, incarceration is usually equated with
punishment in the public eye;59 unconditional confinement of "dangerous"
individuals, especially where treatment is not provided, potently expresses a
goal of condemnation, not of prevention.
To ensure that the duration and nature limitations are taken seriously,
the third essential component of a preventive system is periodic review of
the detention, perhaps every six months and at least annually.6" Further, the
burden should be on the state to demonstrate both the need for continued
liberty deprivation and that treatment efforts are being made. Outside of the
insanity acquittee context, where special considerations may be present,6
57 For instance, at least 47 states require that involuntary patients be committed to treatment in the
least restrictive setting. Ingo Keilitz et al., Least Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Trans-
lating Concepts Into Practice, 29 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 691, 709 (1985).
58 See supra note 55. Also relevant here is Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999),
where the Court held that, under the Americans with Disabilities Act:
States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities
when the State's treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected
persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking
into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.
Id. at 607; see also Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (2000) (relying on Olmstead
and the due process clause in holding that governor's failure to facilitate accessibility to services in the
community states a claim under § 1983). See generally Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good is Bad, What's
Bad is Good, You 'l Find Out When You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom: "Are the Americans with
Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind? ", 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
235, 256 (2002) ("Lower federal courts and state courts have cited Olmstead for the proposition that 'the
ADA in fact prohibits segregation of persons with disabilities and requires states to make reasonable ef-
forts to place institutionalized individuals with disabilities into the community' in the most integrated
setting to fit their needs."). Of course, these latter holdings do not directly address constitutional limita-
tions on the state's police power. What they do recognize is that federal law does not permit avoidable
and unnecessary institutionalization.
59 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 652 (1996) ("Be-
cause of the value of liberty in our culture, imprisonment unequivocally conveys society's denunciation
of wrongdoers.... [while] conventional alternatives ... express condemnation much more ambiva-
lently.").
60 Hendricks emphasized this aspect of the sexual predator statute in finding that it was not punish-
ment. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997).
Far from any punitive objective, the confinement's duration is instead linked to the stated purposes
of the commitment .... If, at any time, the confined person is adjudged "safe to be at large," he is
statutorily entitled to immediate release.... The maximum amount of time an individual can be
incapacitated pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is one year.
Id. Similarly, in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 123 U.S. 1160, 1164 (2003), the
Court strongly suggested that, when dangerousness is the basis for a state deprivation of liberty, a hear-
ing is required to prove "current dangerousness."
61 In Jones v. United States, the Court appeared to hold that, in post-insanity acquittal commitment
hearings, the state may impose the burden of proof on the acquittee, because commitment follows "only
if the acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and proves that his criminal act was a product of
his mental illness." 463 U.S. 354, 367 (1983).
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the Supreme Court has adhered to the sensible rule that the state must show
why preventive detention is necessary.62
In sum, a preventive detention regime requires efforts at treatment, al-
ternatives to institutionalization, and periodic review. If any one of these
three conditions are unmet, then the deprivation of liberty fails to bear a
reasonable relationship to the purpose of preventing harm and either must
end or be justified through the criminal process. Otherwise, as Justice Ste-
vens feared, preventive detention statutes would become an extension of or
replacement for criminal punishment without criminal adjudication.
These limitations may strike some as too few and too easily circum-
vented. In effect, if not in theory, those who are committed may be con-
fronted with a presumption of dangerousness that will be hard for them to
overcome.63 The concept of "treatment" is so vague that the state might
plausibly argue even minimal efforts in that regard are sufficient.64 The ex-
pense and relatively less secure nature of institutional alternatives can act as
a practical brake on their creation and use.65 Periodic review may be pro
forma, a mere rubber stamping of opinions proffered by state doctors.66
Despite these potential problems with implementing the duration, na-
ture, and review limitations on preventive detention, some civil commit-
ment systems manage to adhere to them successfully.67 The popular new
therapeutic courts--drug courts, mental health courts, and the like-also
operate on preventive principles, with little obvious abuse.68 In any event, if
pragmatic objections are to rule the day, then similar objections can be lev-
ied at the main competitor to preventive detention, a system of sentencing
62 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (holding that burden of proof must be on the
state in civil commitment proceedings).
63 Cf Hanson, supra note 36, at 51 (noting that "there is much more evidence to justify committing
offenders than there is for releasing them," because there is much more empirical information about
"static" risk factors, such as past offenses, than "dynamic" risk factors, such as compliance with treat-
ment and alcoholism).
64 John Q. LaFond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the
Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 696 (1992) (describing the "so-
called treatment" provided for individuals committed under Washington's predator commitment law).
65 For a description of the inadequacies of community treatment even during a period when society
was much more committed to it than it is today, see Lawrence Scull, A New Trade in Lunacy: The Re-
commodification of the Mental Patient, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 741 (1981).
66 See discussion concerning the length of commitment under sexual predator statutes infra note
217.
67 For a description of two such programs, see sources cited supra note 56.
68 See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Ex-
perimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 846-48 (2000) (describing rapid development of
drug courts and the constant re-evaluation of their process and efficacy); Steven Belenko, Research on
Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV. 1, 23-24 (1998) ("[D]rug courts generate
savings in jail costs[,] ... probational supervision, police overtime and other criminal justice costs ... r,
as well as] victimization, theft reduction, public assistance and medical claims costs .... "); Amy Wat-
son et al., Mental Health Courts: Promises and Limitations, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 476
(2000).
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based on just deserts and determinate sentencing. As noted earlier, such
sentencing may well be no more "accurate" than one based on prediction.69
Further, in the eyes of many, determinate sentencing is unduly harsh, per-
haps to make up for its inability to individualize.70 Finally, in practice, if
not in theory, it results in a considerable amount of disparity and discrimi-
nation.7" In other words, any attempt to exercise the police power is bound
to fall short of the ideal. Real-life deficiencies should not sound the death-
knell for any particular approach unless it will clearly produce more nega-
tive consequences than other approaches.
C. The Legality Objection
Let us assume that some sort of preventive detention is permissible in
theory, because it is coherently separable from the criminal justice system
and because we can predict dangerousness at least as well as we can assess
culpability. Many controversies yet remain. Some of the more important
swirl around the definition of "dangerousness." The legality objection to
69 See supra text accompanying note 21-23; see also Michael H. Marcus, Comments on the Model
Penal Code: Sentencing Preliminary Draft No. 1, AM. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2003) ("It makes no
sense to deride the [prediction required by dangerous offender statutes] when the default we defend is
overwhelmingly less informed, less careful, less analytical, and routinely productive of astoundingly
high recidivism rates."); SEYMOUR HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 199 (1987)
("[I]ndeterminate programs have usually released offenders earlier than determinate programs, and they
have almost always provided greater numbers of offenders with greater opportunities for freedom.");
John Clear et al., Discretion and the Determinate Sentence: Its Distribution, Control, and Effect on
Time Served, 24 CRIME & DELINQ. 428 (1978) (concluding that Indiana's determinate statute has been a
failure because it continues to allow prosecutorial and judicial discretion and permits "untenably heavy
penalties"). Although insanity acquittees are sometimes confined as long or longer than similarly
charged felons, in many states acquittees are, on average, released earlier. See MELTON ET AL., supra
note 35, at 188-89.
70 The usual proposed alternative to preventive detention is a recidivist statute that enhances sen-
tences based on the number of crimes committed. See LaFond, supra note 64, at 697-98 (suggesting
"extended incarceration, including lifetime imprisonment, for repeat sex offenders"). This general inca-
pacitation approach is likely to inflict heavier periods of confinement on more people than the selective
incapacitation represented by preventive detention. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 67-70 (1995) (comparing general and selective incapacitation and conclud-
ing that the former is at least as problematic as the latter). Recidivist statutes have also been described
as "irrational, internally inconsistent, and racially discriminatory." Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist
Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689, 719 (1995); cf Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct.
1166 (2003) (upholding two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for theft of tapes worth about $150 and
prior convictions for nonviolent offenses); Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (upholding
minimum sentence of 25 years for conviction of three "serious" felonies, the last of which involved theft
of $1,200 of golf clubs).
71 HALLECK, supra note 69, at 202 (the preventive approach "is less discriminatory, imposes less
pain on offenders as a group, and is especially merciful toward selected offenders who can be released
when they are judged to be nondangerous to society"). The most famous experiment with determinate
sentencing, the federal sentencing guidelines, has been lambasted as particularly arbitrary. See gener-
ally, Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 901, 903 (1991) ("[T]he pursuit of equality through sentencing guidelines often has yielded
nonsense rules and inequalities.").
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preventive detention is that the meaning of dangerousness cannot be satis-
factorily cabined, thus allowing the state too much power. Although this
objection is probably overstated, it does force careful thought about the
scope of preventive detention and places at least minimal limitations on
both the types of danger the state may prevent and the situations in which
the state may intervene to prevent them. In doing so, it helps deal with
some conundrums that have vexed those who have wrestled with the pre-
ventive detention question.72
1. Defining Danger.-The principle of legality, famously dubbed the
"first principle" of the criminal law by Herbert Packer,73 means roughly that
the government may neither convict nor punish an individual for an act
unless that act was previously defined as criminal by law.74 The constitu-
tional version of this principle is vagueness doctrine, which as a matter of
due process requires invalidation of statutes that do not sufficiently define
the offending conduct.75 The purposes of vagueness doctrine are to ensure
citizens have notice of the government's power to deprive them of liberty
and concomitantly to protect against the official abuses and the chilling of
innocent behavior that can occur if government power is not clearly demar-
cated.76
Vagueness doctrine should govern the scope of preventive detention
laws even if it is assumed, consistent with discussion in the previous sec-
tion, that such laws are not "criminal" in nature. Indeed, the classic judicial
statement of vagueness doctrine came in a civil case.77 Furthermore, within
the criminal setting the vagueness prohibition has been most potent when
applied to laws that are, in effect, preventive detention statutes in disguise.
Courts most commonly use the doctrine as a justification for invalidating
vagrancy statutes that attempt to remove from the streets "undesirables"
who might be up to no good.7" Courts have also declared void on vagueness
72 See in particular infra text accompanying notes 100-05 and note 117.
73 HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968).
74 Id.
75 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REv. 189, 196 (1985) ("[T]he vagueness doctrine is the operational arm of legality [and] requires that
advance, ordinarily legislative crime definition be meaningfully precise--or at least that it not be mean-
inglessly indefinite.").
76 Id. at 212 ("The evils to be retarded [by the rule of law implemented through vagueness doctrine]
are caprice and whim, the misuse of government power for private ends, and the unacknowledged reli-
ance on illegitimate criteria of selection. The goals to be advanced are regularity and evenhandedness in
the administration of justice and accountability in the use of government power.").
77 In Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), the Court stated that "a stat-
ute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law."
78 See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983);
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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grounds criminal laws that prohibit particularly amorphous dangers, such as
a statute that penalizes "conspiracy to commit any act ... injurious to pub-
lic morals."79
The legality argument against more explicit (non-criminal) forms of
preventive detention is that a statute that permits liberty deprivation based
solely on dangerousness is inevitably vague. Consider a law that permits
detention of those who are "dangerous to others" or "likely to cause sub-
stantial harm to others," with no further definition of dangerousness or
harm. This type of language (sometimes still found in civil commitment
statutes, albeit always combined with a mental illness predicate8") is at least
as empty as the phrase "injurious to public morals." It provides no informa-
tion as to the type of danger a person must pose in order to be committed.
Next consider a law that permits preventive detention of those who are
likely to cause "emotional harm" to another. That phrase is commonly used
in civil litigation and in connection with child neglect petitions. In these
contexts, courts generally reject vagueness challenges." Even so, emotional
harm, whether qualified by the word "serious" or something similar, is such
an open-ended concept that it should not survive a vagueness challenge in
the preventive detention setting82  Far too much legitimate behavior-
ranging from breaking up a relationship to lectures about the meaningless-
ness of life-could be chilled by a law that permitted the government to de-
prive people of liberty simply because their actions might cause someone
else "serious emotional harm."83 The latter phrase could easily be construed
79 State v. Musser, 223 P.2d 193 (Utah 1950); State v. Bowling, 427 P.2d 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
80 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (2003) (permitting commitment of those who are mentally
ill and present a "real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or others").
81 State v. Williams, 451 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that a statute prohibiting in-
tentional use of unreasonable force or cruelty which causes "substantial emotional harm" to a child was
not unconstitutionally vague, despite legislative failure to define the phrase); Marchand v. Superior
Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 531, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
[P]ermitting recovery for serious emotional distress... is consistent with the common law devel-
opment of recovery of damages for wrongful infliction of emotional distress [which] carefully de-
limits the actionability of claims of emotional distress in a manner that ensures that the courts will
not be flooded with a myriad of spurious and trivial claims and that defendants will not be sub-
jected to vague and open-ended liability for consequential emotional harm.
Id.
82 Iowa is one of the few states that explicitly permits civil commitment for "serious emotional in-
jury." That criterion is defined as "[ilnjury which does not necessarily exhibit any physical characteris-
tics, but which can be recognized and diagnosed by a licensed physician or other qualified mental health
professional and which can be causally connected with the act or omission of a person who is, or is al-
leged to be, mentally ill." IOWA CODE § 229.1(14) (2003). That definition makes dangerousness de-
pendent upon the subjective, ever-changing, and inconsistent diagnostic preferences of the mental health
professions. See In Interest of J.P., 574 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 1998) (rejecting commitment based on
"emotional trauma").
83 See Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983) (invalidating statute that punished as harass-
ment any communication that "annoys or alarms the recipient," largely because of the lack of a suffi-
ciently restrictive definition of these terms). On the other hand, emotional harm might provide sufficient
grounds for preventive detention (or punishment) if serious effort is made to limit its scope. For a su-
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to include, for instance, suicidal thoughts, frequent nightmares, and general
depression.
The most obvious starting point in solving these types of problems
would be to describe the danger in terms of harms sanctioned by the crimi-
nal law. That move would provide relatively specific guidelines to the pub-
lic and the government.84 It has the added advantage of incorporating into
the definition of dangerousness those harms society considers serious
enough to warrant application of the police power.
But incorporation of criminal law harms into preventive detention laws
should only be the starting point. Allowing preventive detention for dan-
gers associated with all crimes, including minor ones, is likely to be unnec-
essary. Reflecting that insight, many involuntary hospitalization statutes
define danger in terms of serious bodily injury.85
Note that this latter type of adjustment does not stem from legality con-
cerns; minor harms can be defined as precisely as serious ones. Rather,
they flow from application of the Jackson/due process analysis discussed in
the previous section.86 If the perceived danger is merely minor damage to
property, for instance, then the nature and duration of the government's in-
tervention should be correspondingly minimal, if it occurs at all. In short,
both the procedural (vagueness) and substantive (Jackson) components of
due process are needed to cabin government efforts at defining the scope of
preventive detention.
2. Defining the "Point" of Intervention.-A second legality problem
arises in defining the trigger point for preventive detention. Many preven-
tive detention rules require an overt act before detention may take place.
Sexual predator laws, for instance, require at least a probable cause belief
that the subject has committed a sex offense.87 The typical civil commit-
ment statute, however, does not address this issue, while those commitment
laws that do usually merely require proof of an otherwise undefined act that
perb attempt in this regard, see JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985).
84 See Alan Dershowitz, Dangerousness as a Criterion for Confinement, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 172, 176 (1974) (wondering why legislatures do not address the "fundamental ques-
tion" about what harms justify commitment in the same way they address the harms prohibited by the
criminal law).
85 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 1 (2003) (permitting commitment of those who are men-
tally ill and pose "a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence of
homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent be-
havior and serious physical harm to them."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(2) (West 2002) (requiring
"substantial likelihood" that person "will inflict serious bodily harm on ... another person").
86 See supra text accompanying notes 52-59; see also infra text accompanying notes 230-34 and
253-54 (discussing how the proportionality and consistency principles might limit the dangers that can
lead to preventive detention).
87 For instance, to be eligible for commitment under the Kansas statute at issue in Hendricks (dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 8-10), a person must have been convicted of an offense, acquit-
ted of an offense on mental defense grounds, or found incompetent to stand trial. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a03(a) (2002).
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evidences the danger to be prevented.8" Vagueness doctrine may have some
impact here as well.
The closest criminal analogue is the typical endangerment statute,
which prohibits conduct that either recklessly or negligently endangers oth-
ers. An example comes from the Model Penal Code, which penalizes a per-
son who "recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury."89 Because the Code de-
fines conduct simply as an act or omission,90 reckless endangerment under
this provision could be based on any act or failure to act that creates the
requisite danger. Yet these statutes are routinely upheld against vagueness
challenges by the courts.9'
At the same time, the endangerment laws contain their own notice re-
quirement. Reckless endangerment statutes require that the individual be
aware of the risk,92 and negligent endangerment requires proof that a rea-
sonable person would be aware of the risk.93 Thus, conduct that would not
be evidently risky to a reasonable person cannot form the basis for such
crimes.
The same should be true in the preventive detention context. Unless
the individual engages in conduct that causes legally-defined harm or that is
otherwise obviously risky, the government should not be permitted to inter-
vene preventively. Only in such situations is the individual functionally (as
opposed to officially) on notice that he may be subject to government inter-
vention, and only in such situations is the government's police power ade-
quately cabined.
Consider in this regard a not-so-hypothetical situation in which the
prediction of dangerousness is based on relatively innocuous variables, such
as marital status, age, gender, education, employment, and place of resi-
dence.94 Assume further that the government publishes this list of variables,
88 RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS
679 (3d ed. 1999).
89 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962).
90 Id. § 1.13(5).
91 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that Indiana's criminal reck-
lessness statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or in its application); People v. Lucchetti, 305
N.Y.S.2d 259 (1969) (stating in a memorandum decision that New York's reckless endangerment in the second
degree statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor indefinite); State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1977)
(holding that North Dakota's reckless endangerment statute is not unconstitutionally vague).
92 Under the Model Penal Code, recklessness requires proof that the person "consciously" disre-
gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
93 In Montana, one of the few states with a negligent endangerment statute, see MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-208 (2002), negligence is defined as either conscious disregard of a risk or disregard of a risk "of
which the person should be aware." Id. § 45-2-101 (42).
94 All of these factors correlate to some extent with violence. MONAHAN, supra note 3 1, at 69-76
(examining correlations with respect to first five factors); R.J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Vio-
lent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997) (showing a significant
correlation between concentrated poverty and crime).
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so that it could be said the public is officially on notice as to when preven-
tive detention may take place. Even with such legally sufficient warning
(and putting aside the objection that some of these variables do not amount
to "conduct," an issue to be considered below95), the fact that these variables
are so innocuous should make such a statute void for vagueness.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lambert v. California96 is relevant
here. Lambert reversed on due process grounds a conviction under a statute
that criminalized any felon's failure to register his presence in Los Angeles
within five days of arrival in the city; in reaching this holding, the Court
mentioned an array of considerations, including Lambert's ignorance of the
registration statute, the lack of affirmative misconduct, the absence of
criminal intent, and the possibility the statute would be abused by police or
prosecutors.97 As Professor Jeffries states, "[t]he meaning of [Lambert] is
subject to infinite disputation."" He goes on to assert, however, that it most
sensibly "stands for the unacceptability in principle of imposing criminal li-
ability where the prototypically law-abiding individual in the actor's situa-
tion would have had no reason to act otherwise."99 The argument from
Lambert, then, is that a person who avoids acts that a reasonable person
would perceive as risky cannot be subject to liberty deprivation even when
a statute authorizes it, because a law-abiding individual would behave the
same way and literally "would have no reason to act otherwise." Preventive
detention based on innocuous predictors that the individual is unlikely to
perceive as indicative of dangerousness is a violation of this precept (which,
because it is rooted in due process, applies here as well as in criminal
cases).
The proposition that preventive detention is not permissible unless and
until harm or otherwise obviously risky conduct has occurred raises three
subsidiary issues. The first, alluded to just above, is whether proof of con-
duct is necessary, if sufficient risk is present. This issue conjures up the
scenario (so far one that occurs only in Hollywood)"' in which the basis of
the government intervention consists solely of risk-predictive "characteris-
95 See infra text accompanying notes 100-05.
96 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
97 Id. at 229 (noting that the violation of the ordinance was "unaccompanied by any activity what-
ever," that "circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are com-
pletely lacking," that the ordinance was "a law enforcement technique designed for the convenience of
law enforcement agencies," that Lambert was given no opportunity to register once she learned of the
ordinance, that "actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge"
should be required, and that the failure to register was not "blameworthy").
98 Jeffries, supra note 75, at 211.
99 Id. at 211-12.
100 In the movie Gattaca (Columbia/Tristar Studios 1997), the government is able to predict, simply
through DNA analysis, a person's propensities. At present, we do not have that ability, at least with respect
to anti-social behavior. See ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS
A CLINICAL DISORDER 79 (1993) ("A very tentative and global estimate for the extent of heritability for
crime is that genetic influences account for about half the variance in criminal behavior ... ").
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tics," such as a "violent gene," an inability to empathize, or a biological ad-
diction (all of which might be measurable physiologically, without any ref-
erence to behavior)."' Perhaps these traits are not "obviously risky." But
even if they were, detention in this case would run afoul of the legality
principle. As Packer asserted, "[i]t is important, especially in a society that
likes to describe itself as 'free' and 'open,' that a government should be
empowered to coerce people only for what they do and not for what they
are."'0 2 Accordingly, he argued, the law should require proof of an act, "a
point of no return beyond which external constraints may be imposed but
before which the individual is free-not free of whatever compulsions de-
terminists tells us he labors under but free of the very specific social com-
pulsions of the law."'0 3  If the state's preventive detention power is not
limited by the requirement that it prove some affirmative act that is predic-
tive of a legislatively defined danger, then the government, not the individ-
ual, controls if and when the government intervenes. Putting this idea
another way, conditions, dispositions, and thoughts, even if highly predic-
tive of danger and identified as such, cannot be the "point of no return" de-
scribed by Packer because there is no identifiable "point" at which they can
be avoided. 4
Perhaps the government could avoid this trap by alerting the person to
his or her dangerousness and demanding that the person take preventive
101 The latter two characteristics are clearly correlated with violence. See, e.g., Eric Silver et al.,
Assessing Violence Risk Among Discharged Psychiatric Patients: Toward an Ecological Approach, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 237, 245 (1999) (finding that people diagnosed with psychopathy and alcohol or
substance abuse disorders were "significantly more likely" than those without these diagnoses to commit
violence; 33.9 percent of the first group and 22.5 percent of the second group were violent during fol-
low-up period).
102 PACKER, supra note 73, at 74.
103 Id. Although Packer's comments would seem to apply to any exercise of state power, he made
them while analyzing the scope of the criminal law, "that most coercive of legal instruments." Id. The
Supreme Court seems to have made the same distinction in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
There it held that conviction of a person for being an addict is cruel and unusual punishment, the same
as punishing a person for the "'crime' of having a common cold." Id. at 667. Yet the Court also sug-
gested that, if necessary to promote "the general health and welfare," the state could impose "compul-
sory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration" on addicts, people with mental
illness, or those afflicted with leprosy or venereal disease even, apparently, in the absence of any spe-
cific conduct. Id. at 666. The Court's distinction makes sense as a matter of Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence-because preventive treatment is not punishment and therefore cannot violate that
amendment's prohibition-but it cannot stand in the face of legality concerns, for the reasons discussed
in the text.
104 Indirect support for this point of view also comes from the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, indicating that political speech may not be criminalized unless it incites imminent vio-
lence. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (finding that penalizing mere advocacy and
assembly for the purpose of advocacy, when purpose is not incitement of imminent violence, is a viola-
tion of the First Amendment). But see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1960) (holding that the
state may penalize a person for active membership in organization preaching violent overthrow of gov-
ernment); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (195 1) (upholding conviction for conspiracy to advo-
cate overthrow of U.S. government by violent means).
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steps; if the person does not, that is the point of no return. Some commen-
tators trying to reconcile a preference for criminal punishment with a desire
to protect society against dangerous people have proposed what is, in effect,
the same approach: we could, they suggest, alert dangerous people to their
dangerousness and then convict them for reckless endangerment if they re-
fuse to take preventive action."5 At least from the legality perspective,
however, this move is a sleight of hand. It allows the government to
achieve its precise aim regardless of what the individual decides; if he de-
clines to take the preventive action, the government takes it for him. In ef-
fect, intervention is predicated not on a choice by the individual, but on a
choice by the government, which is precisely what the legality principle is
designed to prevent.
The second subsidiary legality issue concerns the temporal relationship
between the triggering event and the detention. For instance, people sub-
jected to post-sentence sexual predator commitment may not have engaged
in any anti-social conduct for a long period. Should this fact invalidate
post-sentence preventive detention on legality grounds? Probably not.
Functional notice of the specific nature of possible state intervention may
well be lacking. 6 But the individual in this situation surely knew his sex
offense could trigger some sort of serious government reaction, which is all
that vagueness doctrine demands in terms of notice."0 7 Further, so long as
the act is criminal or obviously risky, it prevents the kind of arbitrariness
the legality principle abhors by providing a clear demarcation between
when the government may intervene and when it may not.'0 8
A final legality issue, which may well be the most important, concerns
whether the harm or obviously risky conduct that can act as a trigger for
preventive detention must be criminal. If the danger to be prevented is to
be defined with reference to the criminal law, one might reasonably assume
105 Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113,
152 (1996); cf Corrado, supra note 18, at 806-11.
106 Cf Harris v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D946 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the state is
barred from seeking sexual predator commitment of a defendant who pleads guilty to underlying sexual
offense, unless it notifies the defendant at the time of the plea of the possibility of post-sentence com-
mitment).
107 Cf Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1998) (upholding a conviction for selling
firearms without a license and registration despite ignorance of law claim because offender's conduct
made clear he knew he was engaging in legally questionable conduct). In a similar context, the Supreme
Court has held that when an offender is or should be aware that the prosecution can appeal his sentence
under a special offender law, he has no legitimate expectation in the finality of the sentence. United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137-39 (1980).
108 A clear legality problem does arise, however, when the government releases the individual from
prison and, after a hiatus, tries to commit the individual despite no further misconduct. In that situation
(which is essentially the Lambert facts), the individual is entitled to assume he has suffered the full con-
sequences of his anti-social conduct. Cf In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1008-09 (Wash. 1993) (requiring
new evidence of dangerousness before a person released from prison may be committed under the sex-
ual predator law).
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that the triggering criteria should be as well. Yet some obviously risky
conduct is not criminal. Numerous examples of this fact come from emer-
gency civil commitment cases involving persons alleged to be dangerous to
others." 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court has approved investigative stops
based on suspicious activity that does not amount to a crime. In the well-
known case of Terry v. Ohio,11 for example, the Supreme Court approved
an investigative frisk of individuals who appeared to be "casing" a store-
front and mumbled responses to a police officer's questions about their
conduct, activity that was concededly not criminal."'1
Note, however, that both of these situations involve conduct that, like
the conduct associated with the crime of reckless endangerment, suggests
anti-social behavior is imminent. What if the conduct is more attenuated
from the potential harm? Consider on this score the case of Zacarias Mous-
saoui, described at the beginning of this Article. Moussaoui apparently paid
for flying lessons to learn how to pilot planes, but was uninterested in learn-
ing how to land or take-off." 2 That conduct does not qualify as either a
crime or obviously risky behavior (he may already have known how to
take-off and land, or he may have wanted to take one thing at a time). But
we also know Moussaoui trained in Osama bin Laden's camps and that he
communicated with the participants in the attack on the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001."' That intelligence, combined with the flying les-
sons information, should provide enough evidence of risky behavior in any
reasonable person's eyes. Whether it constitutes the crime of conspiracy,
on the other hand, may depend on the content of the communications with
the WTC attackers. 11
4
If conspiracy cannot be proven, may the government still preventively
detain Moussaoui (assuming the psychological and prediction criteria are
109 See, e.g., George Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis:
An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 504-57. Dix describes 45 commitment cases, several of
which illustrate the point in the text. For instance, Illustration 5 involved a patient who believed he was
an F.B.I. agent, carried at least one weapon, and accused his wife of being a "spy" and his mother-in-law
of poisoning him. Contrast that case to Illustration 29, where the patient had reportedly threatened
members of the family and, on the morning of the hearing, had thrown a cup of coffee on her sister.
Ito 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
III Id. at 22 ("[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner ap-
proach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no prob-
able cause to make an arrest. It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was
discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions.").
112 See supra text accompanying note 3.
113 Id.
114 Conspiracy requires an agreement among two or more individuals to carry out a crime. See
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 622 (2003). Although the agreement can be tacit and proven by in-
ference from subsequent course of conduct, id. at 622-23, mere proof that a communication took place
is unlikely to be sufficient. That may prove to be a significant problem in Moussaoui's case. See John
Gibeaut, Prosecuting Moussaoui, 88 A.B.A. J. 36 (2002) (quoting commentators who question the
prosecution on the ground that there is no obvious act by Moussaoui on which to base the charge).
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met)? In answering this question, it is important to remember that the prin-
ciple of legality is meant to implement two important objectives. In addi-
tion to assuring functional notice, which is presumably present in
Moussaoui's case, the legality principle is meant to control government dis-
cretion. If the triggering act for preventive detention is not an immediate
precursor to the predicted harm (as with emergency commitment and inves-
tigative stops), it must be linked to a statutorily defined crime, or the poten-
tial for government abuse becomes enormous. The version of the
Moussaoui case described above may tempt one to depart from that precept.
But the government's (over)reaction to the events of 9/11, including pre-
ventive detention of American citizens who remain uncharged,"5 provides a
potent counter-reason for applying the same legality constraints on preven-
tive detention that apply to inchoate crimes. Rules such as the agreement
requirement in conspiracy and the conduct-beyond-mere-preparation re-
quirement for attempt crimes ought to apply in the preventive context as
well."6
In conclusion, legality and other due process concerns prohibit the state
from depriving a person of liberty on preventive grounds unless the person
has engaged in conduct that causes serious (physical?) harm or otherwise
obviously evidences risk of serious (physical?) harm." 7 Outside of emer-
gency situations, this precept requires the commission of criminal conduct.
The notion that harmful or obviously risky conduct must precede preventive
government intervention is substantially bolstered by the final objection to
preventive detention.
115 See Editorial, Terror and the Constitution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 2003, at 8 (de-
scribing confinement of Yaser Esam Hamdi, Jose Padilla and six Yemeni men from Buffalo, all Ameri-
can citizens, the first two labeled "unlawful enemy combatants" and held incommunicado with no
lawyers and no specific charge, the Yemeni convicted after pleading guilty because they "were petrified
they would be declared unlawful enemy combatants and sent to a military jail").
116 On the agreement requirement, see supra note 114. The actus reus for attempt, variously de-
fined as conduct that puts the actor in dangerous proximity to committing the crime, conduct that un-
equivocally indicates criminal intent, or a "substantial step" toward committing the crime, must
generally go beyond "mere preparation" to meet the act requirement for attempt. See LAFAVE, supra
note 114, at 588-93. Given the identical triggering point, the question arises as to when the state may
pursue preventive detention rather than punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 118-42 & note
197.
117 Note that the legality principle also identifies a distinction between the person with an infectious
disease and the predator known to be dangerous, a distinction that has eluded commentators who want to
maintain quarantine, but who are not sure about preventive detention. See, e.g., Ferdinand D. Schoe-
man, On Incapacitating the Dangerous, 16 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 27, 34 (1979) ("If there is something
worse about civil preventive detention ... than there is about quarantine, not only have we failed to lo-
cate it, but whatever it is that makes the distinction is nowhere to be found in the literature."); Corrado,
supra note 18, at 811-15. As soon as the infected person goes into the community, he has engaged in
obviously risky conduct that is an imminent threat to others. The same cannot be said for the predator.
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D. The Dehumanization Objection
Suppose that the state is able to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that a person will engage in criminal conduct if not preventively de-
tained, based on conduct obviously evidencing dangerousness. Assume
further that the state is prepared, if commitment occurs, to offer rehabilita-
tion in the least restrictive environment consistent with public safety, with
periodic review. Is there any ground for prohibiting such detention, in light
of the state's compelling need to protect its citizens?
The dehumanization objection to preventive detention is that, even if
all of the other objections are met, a regime that deprives people of liberty
based on what they will do rather than on what they have done shows insuf-
ficient respect for the individual. On this view, preventive detention is, in
effect, either an assertion that the person does not possess the capacity to
choose the good or an assertion that, having such capacity, the person will
not do so. Both assertions, the dehumanization objection posits, are deeply
denigrating to the person's status as a self-governing, autonomous human
being.
1. Preventive Detention's Ambiguous Insult to Autonomy.-The first
possible meaning of preventive detention-that the individual so detained
does not have the capacity to choose the good-is easiest to see as dehu-
manizing. The capacity to choose one's course is an essential aspect of our
notion of what it means to be human. To say that a person lacks that capac-
ity is to treat him like an automaton. For this reason, whatever science may
suggest about how "determined" we are by biological or environmental
forces, the law, and our society at large, assumes we have "free will" (for
lack of a better shorthand term). Again, Professor Packer put it well:
People may in fact have little if any greater capacity to control their con-
duct... than their emotions or their thoughts. It is therefore unrealistic or
hypocritical, so the argument runs, to deal with conduct as willed or to treat it
differently from personality and character. This attack is, however, miscon-
ceived..... The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal sys-
tem, a statement of fact, but rather a value preference having very little to do
with the metaphysics of determinism and free will."8
One dehumanization argument against preventive detention, then, is that it
is the legal manifestation of the humanity-denying belief that those detained
cannot control their fate." 9
118 PACKER, supra note 73, at 75.
119 Morse, supra note 105, at 151 ("[P]ure preventive detention threatens to dehumanize the de-
tainee, treating him as if he were simply a dangerous animal."); JEAN E. FLOUD & WARREN YOUNG,
DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (1981) ("[P]eople do not simply expect or hope to be
treated as harmless; they have a right to be so treated, even if it is more probable than not that they do
intend harm; just as they have a right to be treated as innocent even if it is more probable than not that
they are guilty."); see also infra note 126.
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Perhaps, however, preventive detention can be characterized as an as-
sertion that the detained individual has free will but is predicted to exercise
it in the wrong direction. This conceptualization of preventive detention
appears to avoid Packer's complaint, because it leaves intact the dogma that
we control our fate. Consider, for instance, these comments from Ferdi-
nand Schoeman:
People who have bad eating, smoking, exercise or work habits.., can be sin-
cere in protesting that they will not do something which we have excellent in-
ductive grounds for claiming that they will.... [W]ithout assuming
compulsions or anything at all of a pathological nature, and without denying
autonomy or choice to individuals, we can see how it is that we might come to
discount people's own sincere assertions and resolutions about what they will
do. Hence to make such predictions about people and deal with them on that
basis does not necessarily involve us in changing our image of what it is to be
a person .... 120
In response, the dehumanization objection might be reframed by em-
phasizing the assumption that autonomous individuals, even "dangerous" or
self-harmful ones, always have the potential for choosing the good, an as-
sumption that also underlies such criminal law doctrines as the mere prepa-
ration and abandonment defenses in attempt jurisprudence. 2'
Characterizing preventive detention as a prediction that a person will freely
choose harm may avoid the automaton image, but continues to assert that
the individual will ignore society's clearly stated norms under all circum-
stances, and thus is internally contradictory. It denies the possibility of
autonomous choice while pretending the detained individual is autonomous.
Whether one is persuaded by these arguments depends on one's alle-
giance to the autonomy value. Even as someone who thinks that value im-
portant, I am only half persuaded by the dehumanization objection in the
abstract, precisely because of its abstractness. What I do find palpably de-
humanizing, however, is preventive detention that occurs when both pun-
ishment and preventive detention are options, and the state decides to use
the second form of social control rather than the first. In that instance, illus-
trated by the sexual predator regime, the case against preventive detention is
much stronger, for reasons suggested below.
2. The Right To Be Punished.-As established in the discussion
about legality, preventive detention may not take place unless the individual
has either caused harm to another or has engaged in conduct that evidences
120 Schoeman, supra note 117, at 34.
121 On the mere preparation doctrine, see supra note 116. On the abandonment defense, see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1962) (recognizing a defense to attempt "under circumstances manifesting a
complete and voluntary renunciation of... criminal purpose"); LAFAVE, supra note 114, at 609 (noting
that "on balance, the arguments in favor of recognizing voluntary abandonment as a defense to a charge
of attempt are more persuasive than the arguments against the defense" because, inter alia, renunciation
"'tends to negative dangerousness').
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obvious risk. In cases involving long-term preventive detention, that con-
duct will virtually always also amount to a crime, either a completed of-
fense or an inchoate one, such as attempt or conspiracy. When, if ever, may
the state respond to this conduct through preventive detention rather than
criminal punishment? Putting this question another way, under what cir-
cumstances, if any, may the state be forced to rely on criminal punishment
rather than preventive detention in achieving its police power goals? The
short answer is that the state must choose the punishment route unless, con-
sistent with the two situations just described, it can show that the individual
lacks the capacity or lacks the willingness to adhere to society's basic
norms.
The view that punishment must be imposed on the typical wrongdoer
was succinctly voiced by Hegel, when he contended that punishing the
criminal vindicates "the formal rationality of the individual's volition." '122
According to Hegel, respect for the criminal entails a right to be punished,
because through punishment "the criminal is honoured as a rational be-
ing." '123 Conversely, the criminal "is denied this honour ... if he is regarded
simply as a harmful animal which must be rendered harmless, or punished
with a view to deterring or reforming him."' 24 Several other thinkers in the
deontological tradition similarly argue that offenders have the right to be
punished.'25
Within this concept of the right to be punished lies what I consider the
most persuasive version of the dehumanization objection to preventive de-
tention. If a person who commits a criminal act is not punished, we fail to
treat him as an autonomous human being. 26 If we not only fail to punish
122 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 126 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H. B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge U. Press 1991) (1821) (emphasis deleted).
123 Id. (emphasis deleted).
124 Id.
125 For instance, Kant believed that punishment is designed to serve the individual's ends, namely
recognition of and respect for the individual's humanity. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100-02 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797). See generally LEO KATZ ET AL.,
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 83-96 (1999) (including excerpts from Herbert Morris and Michael
Moore and concluding that "retributivists like Kant, Morris, and Moore... believe that criminals have a
right to be punished"). Scholars who prefer utilitarian arguments have strongly contested this explana-
tion for punishment. See David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623,
1642-57 (1992). 1 make the utilitarian argument against dual track regimes below. See infra text ac-
companying notes 128-30.
126 The modem retributivist literature tends to avoid use of the word "autonomous" and substitute
for it other words, such as "responsible moral agent" or "rational actor." See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Penal
Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 11 (1996).
[T]he objection [to incapacitative punishments] is that such people are detained not for what they
have done but because of what they might do if not detained; but if we are to treat citizens with the
respect due to them as responsible moral agents, we must leave them free to choose whether to
obey the law, and subject them to the coercive attentions of the law only if and when they choose
to break it.
Id. None of these phrases is self-defining; I try to pour some content into them in Part II.
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him, but simultaneously deprive him of liberty, then, to use Hegel's words,
we are treating him simply as a harmful animal. As Hendricks and other
Supreme Court decisions have held, preventive detention is not criminal
punishment.'27 Thus, when the government confronted by a criminal actor
chooses the former means of liberty deprivation over the latter, it declares
in a very real way that the individual so detained is not a person in the full
sense of that word, but rather much closer to Hegel's "harmful animal."
Sexual "predator," the label Kansas legislators chose to affix to those com-
mitted under the statute at issue in Hendricks, brings home the point quite
nicely.
The right to punishment advanced by Hegel and others rests on deonto-
logical claims about the maintenance of human dignity. The utilitarian
might arrive at a similar result, because preventive detention in a dual track
regime could exacerbate, rather than reduce, the public danger, in two
ways. First, when the government chooses to label a miscreant a "predator"
or "dangerous person" in lieu of punishing him as a "criminal offender," as
sexual predator statutes do, it very powerfully announces that the individual
either cannot or will not control his behavior. Research on motivation sug-
gests that this type of labeling might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The
individual shunted into the "predator" system will come to believe that, un-
like those who are punished as volitional actors, he is incapable of acting
differently. That belief in turn could well make him more dangerous. 2
Additionally, the person who knows he is being confined based on specula-
tion about what he will do, while his fellow wrongdoers are instead being
confined for what they have done, could easily come to believe the system
is corrupt.'29 That kind of loss of respect for the legal system also correlates
positively with noncompliant attitudes toward the law and with recidi-
127 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
128 After reviewing a large number of studies on motivation, Professor Winick concluded:
People who believe they lack the capacity to control their harmful conduct because of an internal
deficit that seems unchangeable predictably develop expectations of failure. As a result, they may
not even attempt to exercise self-control, or may do so without any serious commitment to suc-
ceed.... Labeling sex offenders as "violent sexual predators" therefore may reinforce their antiso-
cial sexual behavior.
Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Laws in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 539 (1998); see also John Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 723 (1973) ("[T]he individual who perceives himself as free and responsible be-
haves very differently than the individual who believes that he lacks choice and responsibility. In gen-
eral, the direction of this difference is toward a higher level of awareness, initiative, achievement,
independence and complexity for those who perceive themselves as freely choosing to behave in certain
ways and as responsible for the behavior.") (citation omitted).
129 See Vernon L. Quinsey, Review of the Washington State Special Commitment Center Program
for Sexually Violent Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 704, 705-07 (1992) (reporting that resi-
dents of sexual predator programs "perceive the law to be arbitrary and excessive," and have more dis-
ciplinary violations than they did in prison because of, inter alia, "[r]esident bitterness concerning the
indeterminate nature of their confinement and its imposition at the end of their sentence").
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vism. 130 Although these concerns do not give the individual a "right" to be
punished rather than preventively detained, they do provide consequentialist
support for such a right.
Virtue ethics, a third perspective on the police power of the state, may
also be hostile to a separate system of preventive detention. To a proponent
of this point of view, criminal punishment is a means of inculcating vir-
tue. 131 It can do so only by identifying, through communal deliberations
carried out by the jury, those who are at fault because they have engaged in
flawed practical reasoning and by insisting, through conviction of these in-
dividuals, that they are responsible for the character traits that lead to
crime.'32 In a system where one offender can be subjected to preventive de-
tention based on dangerousness while another who causes the same type of
harm is subjected to punishment based on fault, the law's expressions about
good and bad character are obscured; the first individual is likely to be
viewed, and likely to view himself, as someone who is not responsible for
his personality traits. Again, therefore, punishment is necessary, both as a
"right" of the offender to be treated as someone who can control formation
of his character and as an obligation of society to educate its citizens about
virtuousness.
What I take from this brief discussion of deontological, utilitarian, and
ethical reasoning is that a two-track system that differentiates "offenders"
from "predators" or "dangerous beings" infringes the right of autonomous
humans to be punished for their criminal conduct. In a dual track regime,
those diverted to the "dangerous offender" track are clearly treated as lesser
humans, are more likely to live out the predator prophecy, and are less
likely to be perceived as individuals who are responsible for their character.
That is my version of the dehumanization objection to a separate system of
preventive detention.
3. The Effect Exception to the Right To Be Punished.-Not all liberty
deprivations based on dangerousness have the impact just described. Some
types of preventive detention do not trench on a person's right to be pun-
ished for criminal acts, because they do not in fact deprive the person of
such punishment. These types of preventive detention can be said to fall
130 See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 63-68 (1990) (summarizing research findings to
the effect that compliance with law is based as much on perceived legitimacy as on deterrence and other
factors); Edward Zamble & Frank Porporino, Coping, Imprisonment, and Rehabilitation, 17 CRIM. JUST.
& BEH. 53, 59 (1990) (finding correlation between little respect for system and recidivism).
131 Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 1029
(2000) ("[T]he inculcation of virtue is the criminal law's justifying purpose."). Huigens is the most pro-
lific recent adherent of this approach.
132 Id. (under the virtue ethics approach, "[t]he question before the jury is whether the acts of the
accused in the particular circumstances of the alleged crime displayed inadequate or flawed practical
reasoning, including the deliberations on ends that have gone toward establishing and maintaining his
standing dispositions"); cf Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1447-48
(1995) (describing the Aristoleian view that people are responsible for their character).
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under an effect exception to the right to punishment. Other types of preven-
tive detention after criminal conduct are clearly inconsistent with punish-
ment, but are nonetheless legitimate because the psychological
characteristics of the person divest him of the right to be punished. This
section focuses on the effect exception, while Part II of this Article exam-
ines the psychological criterion for preventive detention.
Numerous species of preventive detention do not foreclose criminal
punishment or do not create a dual track system and therefore fit with the
effect exception I am proposing. For instance, when police stop an individ-
ual on the street upon reasonable suspicion he is contemplating commission
of a crime, they are engaging in preventive detention. Usually, however,
the individual has yet to commit a crime, so criminal punishment is not yet
an option. In any event, this investigative procedure is merely the first step
toward punishment, not a substitute for it.
Other types of pretrial preventive detention may be permissible for the
same reason. In United States v. Salerno,'33 the Supreme Court held that
pretrial preventive detention of an arrestee, in lieu of bail, does not violate
the due process clause, primarily because the duration of the detention is
limited (by speedy trial rules) and the intent behind it is not "punitive."'34
The Court's result in Salerno is correct, although neither of its rationales
should be dispositive. Any preventive detention of an accused person,
however long and whatever its "intent," is suspect if it denies the person the
right to contest his guilt and the right, if found guilty, to be accorded the re-
spect and dignity inherent in punishment for that act. Typically, however,
pretrial detention does not deprive the person of these rights (although it
may become illegitimate if its length renders criminal adjudication a sham
because, for instance, it exceeds the usual punishment for the offense).
Whether post-criminal adjudication dispositions based on dangerous-
ness come under the effect exception depends upon whether one adopts a
strong or weak view of the right to punishment. The strict deontological
position forecloses all use of dangerousness assessments in this context.
For instance, as indicated above, Hegel would have prohibited any punish-
ment that is imposed "with a view to deterring or reforming" the offender.'35
But one can also defend a "weak" view of the right to punishment.'36
The weak view still prohibits preventive confinement when criminal pun-
ishment is an option, but does not automatically bar punishment designed to
accomplish consequentialist ends. Recall the definition of punishment
given earlier.'37 Criminal punishment is based solely on a conviction for an
133 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
134 Id. at 747-48.
135 See supra text accompanying note 124.
136 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 31-32 (1964); H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 88, 182-83, 231-35 (1968).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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offense and can occur only if there is such a conviction. A weak version of
the right to punishment might posit that so long as the disposition occurs
because the individual has been labeled a criminal through the appropriate
process and with the requisite degree of culpability, the right to punishment
has been preserved. That the length of punishment might vary depending
upon other factors (such as dangerousness or general deterrence objectives)
does not change the fact that the individual has been found to have autono-
mously chosen to cause harm.'38
Under the weak version of the right to punishment, therefore, a crimi-
nal sentence that falls within the range dictated by retributive considerations
would clearly be permissible even if the length of the sentence is calibrated
solely through predictions of behavior, as sometimes occurs in sentencing
systems that have maintained parole.'39 The retributive range announces
and demarcates the punishment for the offender's crime. It thus accords the
criminal sufficient respect as an autonomous being.
More difficult to categorize is a criminal sentence that is based entirely
on dangerousness, the so-called "indeterminate sentence."' 4° Functionally,
this regime is very similar to a pure preventive detention regime. But two
significant traits save it from infringing the right to punishment in its weak
form. First, in contrast to a purely preventive regime, in the indeterminate
sentence setting the government officially declares that the individual is
guilty of a criminal act and that he must be punished for it, a declaration
that sounds in retribution, not in dangerousness. Second, in contrast to pre-
ventive detention schemes such as the sexual predator laws, which exist in
addition to criminal sentencing, it avoids the autonomy-denigrating impact
associated with assigning the individual to a "dangerous person" track
rather than the "offender track," because there is only one track.
The same cannot be said, however, of preventive detention that exists
in lieu of criminal punishment, as is authorized under most sexual predator
statutes.' Nor can it be said of preventive detention that follows criminal
138 Both the utilitarian and virtue ethics perspectives are easily reconciled with this weak right to
punishment. If a person who commits anti-social conduct is adjudicated guilty and sentenced at a crimi-
nal trial, he will not be saddled with the debilitating predator label. Likewise, once a person has been
identified as a person with flawed practical reason through the criminal adjudication, society's interest in
publicly defining virtue through the jury has been achieved. Cf Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi
Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 392, 441 (2002) (asserting that the jury's job is to determine "fault," while the
sentencing judge's job is to impose a "just sentence" after considering a number of factors, including
incapacitation and rehabilitation).
139 Norval Morris was one of the first to make such a suggestion. See Norval Morris, Predicting
Violence with Statistics, 34 STAN. L. REV. 249, 253 (1981) ("[Wle may, with justice, [enhance a sen-
tence based on dangerousness], provided the upper sentence limit has been defined other than in relation
to such predictions.").
140 Indeterminate sentences were quite popular in this country and in Great Britain until the mid-
1970s. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 34, 53 (2001).
141 For instance, under the old version of the sexual predator laws-the "mentally disordered sex of-
fender" statutes that were popular until the 1970s-commitment substituted for punishment. See George
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punishment, like that imposed on Hendricks under the Kansas sexual preda-
tor law. The right to punishment may seem to be preserved in the latter
situation, for punishment for the criminal act does take place. But here-as
with preventive detention that functions as a substitute for punishment, and
in contrast to indeterminate sentencing-there are two tracks, the punish-
ment track and the predator track. The individual who, unlike his col-
leagues in crime, is committed after his sentence is served is again singled
out as someone who is less than human, confined not for what he chose to
do but for what he is, a predator. Whatever respect for the person comes
with punishment dissipates the moment the state preventively detains him
in a regime that is separate from criminal punishment, a reality that is not
likely to be lost on the newly designated "predator" himself.'42
Under the "weak" version of the right to punishment theory, then, pre-
ventive detention after criminal conduct is permissible in a wide range of
situations where it does not foreclose criminal punishment, but is generally
impermissible if the government uses it as a substitute for or in addition to
such punishment, because in the latter situations the individual's status as
an autonomous human actor is impugned, a fact which is also likely to in-
crease recidivism. Even in the latter situations, however, preventive deten-
tion is permissible if the individual should not be treated as an autonomous
being, for then the "harmful animal" label is more apposite and is likely to
have less behavioral impact (because it is, or at least seems to be, closer to
the truth). Defining the scope of this psychological exception requires more
elaborate treatment.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERION FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION
The majority opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks indicated, more than
once, that dangerousness alone is an insufficient basis for long-term preven-
tive detention. Although the Kansas statute at issue in that case only re-
quired proof of a "mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes
the person likely to engage in predatory acts of violence,"'43 the Court con-
strued this language to require proof of a disorder that "prevents [the sex of-
fender] from exercising adequate control over [his] behavior."'" At other
points, the Court defined the requisite impairment as an abnormality that
"makes it difficult, if not impossible ... to control.., dangerous behav-
ior"'45 and as a condition that renders the offender "unable to control his
E. Dix, Special Dispositional Alternatives for Abnormal Offenders, in MENTALLY DISORDERED
OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 133, 142-44 (John Monahan & Henry J.
Steadman eds., 1983).
142 See supra note 129.
143 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2002).
144 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997).
145 Id. at 358.
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dangerousness."' 46 The Court also stated that it was Hendricks' "admitted
lack of volitional control" that "distinguishe[d him] from other dangerous
persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through
criminal proceedings."'47 In Kansas v. Crane,4 8 decided in 2002, the Court
reiterated that preventive incarceration must generally be accompanied by
"proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,"'49 although it left open
the question of whether dangerousness due to "emotional" impairment
might also legitimately form the basis for detention. 5
The critics of Hendricks have argued that the Court's inability-to-
control criterion is either meaningless or overbroad. The most commonly
proposed alternative psychological criterion is some form of serious mental
disorder, akin to that which is required for an insanity defense. 5' That tack
would render the typical sexual predator commitment invalid, as most sex
offenders, Hendricks included, do not meet traditional insanity tests.
My position is somewhere between the Court's and the critics'. The
Court's inability-to-control standard is vacuous to the extent it suggests the
state must show some type of "involuntary" behavior or criminal impulse
caused by overwhelming urges. At the same time, traditional insanity for-
mulations, although adequate at defining autonomy for the purpose of as-
sessing criminal responsibility, are too narrow when the goal is delineating
the psychological criterion for preventive detention. I suggest the focus
should instead be on the individual's undeterrability, a standard that would
allow preventive detention of some people who are not seriously mentally
ill. At the same time, it would stop short of authorizing such detention for
all, or even most, who have impulse disorders. In short, the formulation
proposed here would encompass people who are lacking in autonomy due
to mental disability and the like, as well as that small category of people
who are not insane but who can nonetheless be denied the right to punish-
ment because of their manifest obliviousness to society's most important
criminal prohibitions.
146 Id. at 358, 364.
147 Id. at 360.
148 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
149 Id. at 413.
15o Id. at 415 ("The Court in Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether confinement based
solely on 'emotional' abnormality would be constitutional, and we likewise have no occasion to do so in
the present case.").
151 For a sampling of the commentary in this vein, see Stephen Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and
Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1026-27 (2002) (arguing that sexual predator commitment
should be limited to those who are "non-responsible"); ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPETENCE,
CONDEMNATION, AND COMMITMENT 149-50, 165-66 (2001) (arguing that police power commitment is
permissible only for those who lack "retributive competence" and comparing the latter concept to insan-
ity); Eric Janus, Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of Police Power Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 297, 298 (1998) ("Properly understood, the Hendricks decision will limit civil commitment
to those who are 'too sick to deserve punishment."' (quoting Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1968))).
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A. The Inability-to-Control Formulation
Although the Court never clearly provides it in either Hendricks or
Crane, there is at least one plausible rationale for permitting preventive de-
tention based on proof of volitional impairment and dangerousness. It
builds, as previous discussion has already suggested, on the right to pun-
ishment theory. That right exists because we want to treat people as
autonomous beings who will choose to avoid commission of crime. If an
individual's urge to commit crime is so strong that he is unable to control it,
one can argue that he has demonstrated he is not an autonomous being; a
person who is "dangerous beyond [his] control," ' to use the Court's words,
is closer to Hegel's "harmful animal" than to a volitional human actor.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the Court's approach is problematic to the
extent it relies on the concept of volitional impairment. Truly "involuntary"
acts are rare. Illustrated by epileptic seizures and perhaps some dissociative
states,'53 they require a disjunction between mind and body that seldom oc-
curs even in people with severe mental illness, much less in sexual preda-
tors and like offenders.
154
If instead the concept of volitional impairment is meant to refer to con-
scious control over bodily movements that nonetheless are "compelled" by
"irresistible impulses," then as Stephen Morse, Robert Schopp, and others
have demonstrated, the concept becomes meaningless, or so expansive that
it could include most criminal behavior.155 Even conduct that the actor per-
ceives to be the product of strong urges is "willed," in the sense that the ac-
tor decides to engage in it. The addict who steals to feed a habit, the sexual
predator who molests a child, and the psychotic individual who kills all in-
tend, and often plan, their actions. Further, they all probably could have
avoided those actions, in the sense that they knew of and were able to
choose other options.'56 Finally, for many of these individuals the criminal
152 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
153 See MELTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 203-04 (discussing the involuntary act defense).
154 The Model Penal Code defines involuntary acts to exclude everything but reflexes and convul-
sions, bodily movement during sleep, conduct during hypnosis, and other "bodily movement that other-
wise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962).
155 See Stephen Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1587, 1619-34 (1994) (arguing
that internal coercion is either insufficient to excuse or so debilitating that it amounts to irrationality and
thus is unnecessary as an independent excusing condition); ROBERT SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY,
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 165-74 (1991) (ar-
guing that the concept of volitional impairment as an excuse is "either unnecessary and irrelevant
or. . . vacuous").
156 See HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 162 (1972) (noting that re-
gardless of how impaired a person is, it is still "the person himself who initiates and carries out the deed,
it is his desire, his mood, his passion, his belief which is at issue, and it is he who acts to satisfy this de-
sire, or to express this mood, emotion, or belief of his"); SCHOPP, supra note 155, at 181 ("[A]ccepting
the proposition that individuals cannot control ... intrusive urges and fantasies . . . does not entail that
they cannot refrain from acting on these mental events."); E. Michael Coles, Impulsivity in Major Men-
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act is pleasurable, rather than a method of avoiding psychological pain, or is
at least a combination of the two.' For all of these reasons, identifying
precisely how such actions are "compelled" is difficult. While such people
may seem to have overwhelming urges, they still choose to act on those
urges and they do not seem to be compelled in the same way a person act-
ing with a gun pointing at his head is compelled.
Even if one can make sense of the compulsion notion in the abstract, it
seems to sweep too broadly in practice. As Michael Moore has noted,'58 all
behavior is caused by something not directly in one's control, whether it is
biological, environmental, or characterological. Thus, a case can be made
that volition is always "impaired." Attempting to draw the line between
those who are "compelled" and those who are merely "caused" creates
daunting problems. For instance, despite popular perceptions and the Su-
preme Court's own assumptions,'59 evidence that the impulses experienced
by addicts, sexual offenders, and people with psychosis are stronger than
those that lead people to commit more typical crimes is hard to come by;
burglars recidivate at least as much as sex offenders, 6 ' and white collar
criminals are probably just as likely to be "driven" by urges, albeit for
things like wealth, fame, or power rather than (or perhaps in addition to)
drugs or sex. 6'
The breadth of the inability-to-control concept has been recognized by
researchers and clinicians alike. Representative is the claim by social scien-
tists Plutchik and van Praag. In their paper "The Nature of Impulsivity,"
they note that impulsivity has been associated with borderline personality
disorder, anti-social personality disorder, hyperactive syndrome, alcohol-
tal Disorders, in IMPULSIVITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 180, 189 (Christopher D. Web-
ster & Margaret A. Jackson eds., 1997) ("With the obvious exceptions of delirious and comatose indi-
viduals ... the expression of a socially unacceptable impulse invariably reflects some control."); Morse,
supra note 155, at 1605 (concluding that "out of control agents should sometimes be excused, but not
because they do not choose to do what they do").
157 Morse, supra note 155, at 1624 ("[F]or many people affected by the so-called paraphilias, some
impulse disorders, and drug dependence, satisfying the desire produces positive pleasure as well as the
avoidance of pain.").
158 Michael Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1665 (1980)
("Everyone is undoubtedly caused to act as they do by a myriad of environmental, physiological, or psy-
chological factors. Yet to say that any actions caused, for example, by an unhappy childhood, a chemi-
cal imbalance, or a belief that it is raining, is not to say the actions are compelled.").
159 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (speaking of distinguishing "a dangerous sexual
offender subject to civil commitment" from "other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly
dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings" (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360
(1997))).
160 The recidivism rate for burglary (31.9 percent) is four times higher than that for rape (7.7 per-
cent). David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes " Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 529, 572 (1994).
161 Morse, supra note 155, at 1631 ("There is simply no scientific or clinical evidence that 'abnor-
mal' desires are necessarily stronger than 'normal' desires and thus that abnormal desires uniquely
threaten unbearable dysphoria and produce a consequently harder choice.").
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ism, substance abuse, brain damage, anorexia nervosa, violent behavior,
neurological "soft signs," rage and aggression, homicide, sexual assault,
risk taking, error-prone information processing, bipolar disorders, klepto-
mania, pyromania, addictions, perversion, and some sexual disorders.'62
Any concept that encompasses such a broad array of behavior and condi-
tions is close to useless as a meaningful legal limitation.
In any event, gauging the strength of criminal desires, or the weakness
of the will to resist them,'63 is a scientific impossibility at this point. De-
spite repeated attempts to develop instruments that measure impulsivity,
there is no generally accepted, or even partially accepted, formulation of the
construct." In contrast to prediction of risk, where major advancements
have occurred, instruments for assessing volitional impairment are in a very
primitive state.'65
In short, predicating preventive detention on a showing that a person's
dangerousness is something he cannot control appears to be a theoretical
and practical dead end. It will involve courts in the quagmire of trying to
distinguish the impulse that was irresistible from the impulse that was not
resisted.'66 The psychological criterion for preventive detention should rest
on a sounder conceptual basis.
162 Robert Plutchik & Herman M. van Praag, The Nature oflmpulsivity: Definitions, Ontology, Ge-
netics, and Relations to Aggression, in IMPULSIVITY AND AGGRESSION 7-8 (Eric Hollander & Dan J.
Stein eds., 1995); see also Coles, supra note 156, at 187 (speaking of "the status of impulsivity as a pri-
mary, if not universal, criterion of every mental disorder that is clearly anti-social and/or irrational").
163 One of the reasons this area of inquiry is so difficult is that we do not know how to distinguish which
of these two possibilities, if either, is in operation during "impulsive" action. See generally P.S. Greenspan,
Genes, Electrotransmitters, and Free Will, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 243, 248 (David
Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit eds., 2001) (noting that "[i]nstead of looking at the element of internal
threat--the urges that arguably overcome the will to resist and hence make action less than fully voluntary-
we might shift our explanatory focus to the will itself, the psychological resources that enable an agent to resist:
what is commonly called 'strength of will,"' and then exploring the difficulties of doing so).
164 One review of the methods used to measure impulsivity concluded that "researchers need to be
very cautious when selecting impulsivity measures," because the different measures "appear to be as-
sessing very different constructs," even when they use the same methodology. James D.A. Parker & R.
Michael Bagby, Impulsivity in Adults: A Critical Review of Measurement Approaches, in IMPULSIVITY:
THEORY, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT, supra note 156, at 142, 154-55; see also Judy Zaparniuk &
Steven Taylor, Impulsivity in Children and Adolescents, in IMPULSIVITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT AND
TREATMENT, supra note 156, at 158, 174 ("[S]tudies of adults, adolescents, and children show that im-
pulsivity measures are often uncorrelated with one another, and that impulsivity is a multidimensional
construct. There have been too few studies to determine the nature of the underlying factors.").
165 Id. For instance, one instrument used in insanity cases measures volitional impairment by ask-
ing the evaluator to use a six criteria template, ranging from whether the individual "was in complete
control of his/her behavior and chose to commit the crime" to whether the individual "was completely
out of control of his/her behavior throughout all of the criminal act." Slobogin, supra note 22, at 947
n. 124 (describing the R-CRAS instrument).
166 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 11 (Dec. 1982) ("The line
between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twi-
light and dusk."), quoted in A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 341 n.49 (1989).
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B. The Insanity Formulation
A promising candidate in this regard is simply to equate the psycho-
logical criterion with insanity.'67 The insanity defense is meant to define
those who lack criminal responsibility, which describes a group that would
seem to coincide perfectly with those who can be preventively detained be-
cause their lack of autonomy forfeits the right to punishment. Further, be-
cause most modem versions of it focus simply on cognitive impairment,'68
the insanity inquiry is relatively straightforward compared to the assessment
of volitional impairment required under Hendricks.'69
Some insanity tests have included a volitional impairment prong as
well. 7° If that prong were a necessary component of the insanity defense,
then equating the psychological criterion for preventive detention with in-
sanity might rejuvenate all of the conceptual and practical difficulties just
discussed. But most jurisdictions have rejected the volitional prong. 7' Fur-
thermore, as Morse has demonstrated, many cases of volitional impairment
can be re-characterized as deficits in cognition.'72 For instance, the klepto-
maniac who steals for no apparent reason (because he merely hides what he
steals without attempting to make money from it) could be said to have an
irrational thought process, as could the person with mania who carelessly
167 For those who have proposed this solution, more or less, see supra note 151. I have endorsed
this approach as well, see Slobogin, supra note 4, at 364-66, although in this Article I refine that posi-
tion.
168 Most jurisdictions today have adopted either the M'Naghten test or a truncated version of the
Model Penal Code test; about twenty still retain a "volitional" prong. See RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E.
AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-
HINCKLEY ERA 251-63 (1988). The M'Naghten test asks whether the offender's mental disease or de-
fect made him unable to know the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong. The Model Penal
Code test focuses on whether a person's mental disease or defect made him substantially unable to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of his act or substantially unable to conform his behavior to the requirements
of the law. The "truncated" version of the Model Penal Code test, which governs in federal courts and
several state jurisdictions, eliminates the latter, volitional prong of the defense. See generally REISNER
ET AL., supra note 88, at 522-27 (explicating these tests further).
169 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 166, at II ("Many psychiatrists ... believe that psy-
chiatric information relevant to determining whether a defendant understood the nature of his act, and
whether he appreciated its wrongfulness, is more reliable and has a stronger scientific basis than, for ex-
ample, does psychiatric information relevant to whether a defendant was able to control his behavior.").
170 See supra note 168.
171 In addition to the difficulty of assessing volitional impairment, another reason for this position
may be that "the exculpation of pyromaniacs [and others with so-called impulse disorders] would be out
of touch with commonly shared moral intuitions." Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity
Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 197 (1983).
172 Morse, supra note 155, at 1626 ("[l~t is difficult to envision a case in which the defendant was
suffering from a severe mental disorder with marked 'coercive' features, but was substantially rational.
Virtually all cases that would justify acquittal by reason of insanity or partial responsibility mitigation
demonstrate that marked irrationality infected the practical reasoning that motivated the criminal con-
duct.").
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spends money in grandiose schemes because of inaccurate beliefs about
himself and the world.
Under a cognitively-focused insanity defense, the psychological crite-
rion would be defined by such factors as the actor's ability to distinguish
right from wrong, the intelligibility and consistency of his desires and be-
liefs, and the nature of his thought process.' These are not easy assess-
ments. But they are more sensible and more manageable than the volitional
inquiry.'74 Further, calling such people "dangerous" is not likely to increase
their recidivism, either because the label means little to them or because
they can attribute their dangerousness to a "disease," which generally can
be treated.
Making insanity the psychological criterion for preventive detention
thus appears to satisfy both right to punishment theory and the desire for a
meaningful standard. Nonetheless, this simple equation does not work, if it
means that people who are sane may never be subject to long-term preven-
tive detention. That is because it fails to encompass the second of the two
situations in which the right to punishment does not apply-when the actor,
though sane, signals a desire to ignore society's most significant norms re-
gardless of the circumstances. The next section explores this objection
more fully.
C. Back into the Quagmire: The Undeterrability (Unawareness or
Recklessness) Formulation
Despite its incoherence, the Supreme Court's inability-to-control for-
mulation does capture a widely shared view that some individuals-
including some sex offenders-are sane under the traditional cognitive im-
pairment tests, yet seem to be lacking a fundamental aspect of autonomy. If
Hendricks is to be believed, only his death would prevent him from molest-
ing children, despite his acknowledgement that such activity is criminal and
would subject him to punishment.'75 This type of dysfunction, whether it is
labeled a mental abnormality or simply described in terms of its effects,
smacks more of conditioned, animal behavior than human conduct.
For reasons already discussed, trying to describe this intuition in terms
of impulse control is futile. Taking a cue from Morse, another way of get-
173 The precise focus would depend, of course, on the insanity formulation adopted. Traditional
tests focus more on distinguishing right from wrong. See supra note 168. An irrationality test would
focus more on the consistency of desires and beliefs. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY:
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 100-08 (1984). Schopp's formulation would concentrate on the
thought process. SCHOPP, supra note 155, at 185-98. I have proposed abolition of the special defense
of insanity, replacing that inquiry with one focused on the extent to which mental illness supports sub-
jectively defined mens rea and justification defenses. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Re-
casting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (;000).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
175 See supra text accompanying note I. Additionally, Hendricks stated that "he hoped he would
not sexually molest children again." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997).
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ting at the "dangerous beyond control" concept is by focusing on cogni-
tion-the desires and beliefs that motivate the behavior and the process by
which they are formed. But Morse's specific proposal-that claims of voli-
tional impairment should be reanalyzed in terms of the "rationality" of the
motivating desires and beliefs' 76-may not get us very far. As Morse himself
admits, while "there is something more than a little wacky about wanting
anything 'too much,'... how much is 'too much' will of course depend on
the circumstances, including social conventions."' 77 To many people, the per-
son who seems to act impulsively, against his own apparent interests, will al-
ways be irrational. Indeed, many commentators have noted that impulsivity
and irrationality are all but synonymous.'78 If that is the outcome of Morse's
proposal-if child molesters, addicts, and people with bad tempers are all
seen as irrational' 79-- that concept may be as vacuous as control formulations.
176 See Morse, supra note 151, at 1036 ("Lack of capacity for rationality is a genuine and limiting
non-responsibility standard that would meet substantive due process requirements for the justification of
involuntary civil commitment of sexual predators.").
177 Morse, supra note 155, at 1632.
178 For instance, according to Ronald Blackburn, "labels implying 'compulsion' are.., applied
when neither the perpetrator nor an observer can account for the behaviour in terms of motives which
are current, popular, or culturally sanctioned." RONALD BLACKBURN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL
CONDUCT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 74 (1993). He continued:
[Impulse control disorders are] explanatory fictions introduced when people are unable to attribute
their repeated deviant acts to an "acceptable" or "rational" cause.... While there is a case for sub-
dividing particular forms of repetitive deviant behaviour according to categories of motive (or re-
inforcer), a classification which effectively rests on arbitrary distinctions between "rational" and
"irrational" has no scientific utility.
Id. Consider also this comment:
Most commentators recognize that behavior deemed impulsive is, in various combinations and de-
grees, associated with the timing and tempo of one's comportment, failure to reflect, impetuosity,
lack of self-restraint, irrationality, explosiveness, unpredictability, nonutilitarianism, and other
such qualities. Yet, on reflection, not only are these various descriptors inescapably mired in cul-
tural expectations and social biases, but there is little evidence that they collapse into anything ap-
proaching a discrete cluster with systematic, stable, or measurable properties.
Robert Menzies, A Sociological Perspective on Impulsivity: Some Cautionary Comments on the Genesis
of a Clinical Construct, in IMPULSIVITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT, supra note 156, at
42, 54. Morse himself seems to recognize this problem when he states that "[a]lthough I am sympa-
thetic to claims that the rationality of desires or ends is difficult to assess, I am finally convinced, by ma-
lignantly circular reasoning perhaps, that it must be irrational to want to produce unjustified harm so
intensely that failure to satisfy that desire will create sufficient dysphoria to warrant an excuse." Morse,
supra note 155, at 1634.
179 Morse contemplates that all of these people might behave irrationally, although he thinks such
cases will be very rare. Morse, supra note 151, at 1074 ("[A] small number of sexual predators may
have a rationality defect that extends generally over the domain of sexual behavior .... Leroy
Hendricks may have presented precisely this case."); Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 263 (2000) (stating that "'addictions,' so-called 'pathological' or 'compulsive'
gambling, 'deviant' sexual desires, and the like" do not involve problems of compulsion "but in some
cases the desire may be so intense that it undermines the capacity for rationality"); Morse, supra note
155, at 1649 (suggesting that "crimes of 'passion,' committed in heightened emotional states, such as
fear and rage, . . . may seal off access to the ordinary desires, beliefs, and intentions that permit volitions
to resolve the inevitable conflict by being properly responsive to ... background factors"); id. at 1636
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I propose, instead, that we should answer the question of "how much is
too much" with reference to the most conspicuous and powerful "social
convention," the criminal law. If a person wants to commit serious crime
so badly that he is willing to be deprived of liberty or suffer similarly seri-
ous consequences for it, then he should be eligible for preventive detention,
whether the desire stems from mental illness, subliminal "drives," or cold
calculation. This type of person is truly "undeterrable" by the criminal law,
and thus is precisely the person who should be subject to its alternative:
preventive detention. In contrast, the person who is not willing to suffer
punishment in order to achieve his desires is deterrable, and we should re-
spect his autonomy by assuming he will be deterred.
Justice Scalia may have been hinting at this notion in his dissenting
opinion in Crane, when he tried to defend sexual predator laws by stating
that "[o]rdinary recidivists choose to re-offend and are therefore amenable
to deterrence through the criminal law; those subject to civil commitment
under the [sexual predator act], because their mental illness is an affliction
and not a choice, are unlikely to be deterred.""18 Although this moves to-
ward an undeterrability criterion, Justice Scalia's manner of expressing it,
like the inability-to-control formulation in Hendricks, is incoherent. The
Justice is right that mental illness is "not a choice." But the behavior that
flows from it usually is. Furthermore, recidivists, even "ordinary" ones, are
by definition "unlikely to be deterred."
Preventive detention should be aimed at the truly undeterrable. This
notion is most meaningfully expressed not in terms of lack of control, irra-
tionality, or the "likeliness" of being deterred, but rather in terms of two
other psychological tendencies: either (1) unawareness that one is engag-
ing in criminal conduct; or (2) extreme recklessness with respect to the
prospect of serious loss of liberty or death resulting from the criminal con-
duct. The person who is truly undeterrable by the criminal law is one who
characteristically either commits criminal conduct not believing it to be
criminal or commits the conduct knowing it is criminal but willing to suffer
the consequences in order to accomplish his criminal aims. Like the irra-
tionality formulation, the language of ignorance and recklessness avoids
problematic talk about compulsion; it does not deny that criminal actors
generally choose their actions, while aware of their options. But unlike an
irrationality test, this language focuses precisely on the desires and beliefs
of the actor that make the person undeterrable.
Note that the lack of awareness subcategory of the undeterrability con-
cept is similar to, if not synonymous with, the cognitive prong of the insan-
ity defense, which traditionally has focused on knowledge of the nature and
quality of the act and knowledge of whether the act was wrong. A person
who experiences delusions or hallucinations that lead him to think he is
(wondering whether psychopaths should be excused on irrationality grounds).
180 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 420 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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shooting. a tree rather than a person,18" ' or that an individual who wants to
shake his hand is attacking him,' will not be affected by the relevant pro-
hibitions of the criminal law. Numerous other distorted perceptions of real-
ity could render perpetrators oblivious to the criminal implications of their
actions or convinced that there are none.'83 An added advantage of the un-
awareness formulation is that it would permit commitment of those who
successfully assert an unconsciousness defense (as in sleepwalking and epi-
lepsy cases).'84 Currently this group of people causes significant problems
for the criminal justice system because, having been acquitted on grounds
other than insanity, there is no provision for their post-trial commitment. 85
Yet these people should be subject to preventive detention if their uncon-
sciousness is likely to cause further harm, because in that state they are
truly undeterrable.
The recklessness subcategory of undeterrability describes an entirely
different set of people-"sane" people who know they are committing a
crime and are aware of a significant risk of apprehension and long-term
deprivation of liberty, but who commit it anyway. The old policeman-at-
the-elbow test puts the matter succinctly.'86 A person who is likely to com-
mit a crime while observed by law enforcement officers or in situations
similarly likely to lead to apprehension is, by definition, on the far end of
the undeterrability spectrum. In contrast, the typical recidivist will avoid
committing a crime under such conditions.
In short, the recklessness subcategory of undeterrability identifies peo-
ple who prefer crime to freedom.'87 I would also require, however, that the
181 Cf People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 1978) (involving a person suffering from schizo-
phrenia who was found in another person's apartment wearing that person's clothes and cooking his
food and who was shocked and embarrassed when told apartment was not his).
182 Cf M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843) (involving a person suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia who believed target of assassination was attempting to have him killed).
183 Whether the unawareness formulation described in the text encompasses all who would be ex-
cused under the Model Penal Code's popular "appreciation of wrongfulness" insanity test, MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962), would depend on how the latter test is interpreted. For the record, the un-
awareness group would be broader than the group that I would exculpate from crime, because I believe
exculpation is based on assessments of blameworthiness, not undeterrability, and some people who meet
the Model Penal Code test are still blameworthy in my view. See Slobogin, supra note 173, at 1202-08
(advocating exculpation only of those whose mental illness leads to the absence of mens rea or a motiva-
tion for the crime that sounds in justification, duress, or "general ignorance of the law").
184 Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962) (excusing involuntary acts such as "reflex or convul-
sion; a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; conduct during hypnosis or resulting from
hypnotic suggestion; [and] a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determina-
tion of the actor, either conscious or habitual").
185 See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MiNN. L.
REv. 269, 285 (2002) ("In contrast to defendants determined to be insane, defendants with automatism and
unconsciousness receive an unqualified acquittal and do not face the possibility of being institutionalized.").
186 For a description of this test, see United States v. Kunak, 17 C.M.R. 346, 357-58 (C.M.A. 1954).
187 This formulation does not necessarily exclude offenders or potential offenders who try to avoid
apprehension. Even people with very strong desires to commit crime will try to avoid detection before
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anticipated/ignored loss of freedom be substantial. That caveat ensures that
the person is truly undeterrable, as opposed to someone who could be de-
terred with significant enough disincentives.
Very few people would fit in the recklessness category so defined, but
those who do might be divided into two types. The first group would be
composed of those who commit the crime primarily to achieve their own
ends. These would include the individual with mania whose grandiosity
leads him to commit rape in full view of the public,'88 the individual who
rapes while being actively pursued by the police,'89 and the individual (like
Hendricks?) who routinely commits sexual acts in situations where it is
"almost inevitable" (to use the phrasing of one court wrestling with this is-
sue) that he will be caught. 9 ' These examples, taken from actual cases,'
all involve sex offenders. But cases involving other types of offenders can
be imagined; in particular, individuals who routinely engage in homicidal
assaults in public fora, like Garry David (described at the beginning of this
Article), are apparently unaffected by a very high likelihood of apprehen-
sion. '9 All of these people can be considered undeterrable, even though
they are not insane under traditional definitions, because their desire for the
"benefit" they receive from crime is demonstrably greater than their fear of
significant punishment.
The second group that might be said to be undeterrable because of
recklessness toward the prospect of punishment commits crime to achieve
they commit their act; otherwise, they will not be able to commit it. And after the act is complete and
their desire is sated, they will presumably try to elude detection. This formulation does require, how-
ever, that the individual is the type of person who commits crime while aware of a very substantial risk
that he will be caught and subjected to a serious deprivation of liberty or death. That is what distin-
guishes these people from the typical burglar, murderer, rapist, or car thief. Given a choice between
punishment and foregoing crime, the typical criminal would choose the latter option.
188 See case of Seth Hedges, in MELTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 563-67.
189 See In re Kunshier, No. C7-95-1490, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1422 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
1995), reported in Alan Held, The Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators-Experience Under Minne-
sota's Law, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR: LAW, POLICY, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 2-1, 2-19 (Anita
Schlank & Fred Cohen eds., 1999).
190 See In re Crocker, No. CO-95-2500, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 495 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23,
1996), aff d (Minn. Jan. 21, 1997), reported in Held, supra note 189, at 2-19. It is not clear from the
facts reported by the Court whether Hendricks would meet the recklessly undeterrable test, although it
appears that several of his crimes were committed under circumstances in which detection was a fore-
gone conclusion. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354 (1997) (recounting that Hendricks was
convicted for molesting two young boys while working at a carnival, was paroled after two years, rear-
rested for molesting a 7-year-old girl, spent five years in prison and then "shortly thereafter" molested
two more children).
191 See supra notes 188-89.
192 Another example may be people who are subject to "automatisms." For instance, apparently
people who suffer a "Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction" can "commit an out-of-character, emotionless,
homicidal act as a result of an external stimulus that triggers painful memories of stressful past events
and propels the patient into a series of regressive, well recalled, and automatic actions." Denno, supra
note 185, at 293 n. 90.
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goals that are largely unselfish. Into this category might fall those who
want to kill abortion clinic doctors,'93 assassinate prominent political lead-
ers, 194 or commit terrorist acts in full view of others, knowing escape is un-
likely.' 95 These people are neither mistaken about the prohibitions of the
law nor forgetful of them, but rather believe them to be irrelevant. They
know they will either be caught or die, but believe their ideological agenda
justifies their actions and glorifies their punishment or death.'96 These peo-
ple, like those who choose crime over freedom for selfish ends (and unlike
those who are insane), will generally be punished for the triggering act re-
quired by the principle of legality. But if, after punishment, they remain
reckless toward its imposition, preventive detention should be an option. 97
Although both groups of reckless offenders are undeterrable in the
strict sense developed here, preventive detention in lieu of or in addition to
criminal punishment is likely to be more strongly resisted in connection
with the second group. As noted above, those who choose crime over free-
dom for their own ends seem remarkably similar to conditioned animals. In
contrast, those who choose crime over freedom to achieve political or ideo-
logical goals seem to be acting more "volitionally." To use Morse's lan-
guage, the latter group appears to be more "rational." Thus, the argument
might go, the dehumanization objection (which I have assumed is valid at
least in a dual-track regime) should apply to preventive detention of this
second group.
Recall, however, that preventive detention eludes the dehumanization
objection if the government can show the individual so detained lacks
autonomy or it can show he will exercise his autonomy in the anti-social di-
193 Cf Tom Kuntz, From Thought to Deed. In the Mind of a Killer Who Says He Served God, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at 7 (recounting case of Michael Griffin, who argued a combination temporary
insanity/necessity defense, but was convicted of shooting physicians outside abortion clinics in Florida).
194 Cf Mark C. Alexander, Religiously Motivated Murder: The Rabin Assassination and Abortion
Clinic Killings, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161, 1161-63 (1997) (recounting case of Yigal Amir, who killed Is-
raeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and argued at trial that the killing was necessary to save Israeli Jews
from Rabin and his peace plan).
195 Consider, for example, the events of September 11, 2001.
196 Note that anyone who raises a defense of necessity could fit in this category. See, e.g., State v.
Dorsey, 395 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1978) (defendants charged with trespass at a nuclear power plant asserted
that danger posed by plant warranted a choice of evils defense). In the typical political protest case,
however, even the most enthusiastic protester will not commit the type of crime that could lead to seri-
ous liberty deprivation, which is the gravamen of the recklessness component of undeterrability.
197 As a bow to the right to punishment, and to help address the uncertainty problem mentioned be-
low, the government could be required to punish before considering preventive detention when both
punishment and detention are an option. A sufficiently long sentence might obviate the need for subse-
quent detention. But sentences based primarily on just desert need not be long, even when the crime in-
volved is serious, as it would be here. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 36-46
(1993) (proposing a five year maximum for homicide and a three year maximum for all other crimes).
In such cases, preventive detention may be a viable option and, at the same time, alleviate some of the
pressure to ratchet sentences upward on general incapacitation grounds.
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rection regardless of circumstance. 98 Proof of this second type of undeter-
rability can never be certain, but neither can we be sure a person lacks
autonomy; 9 9 if a showing of insanity is a good enough proxy for an absence
of autonomy, proof of a commitment to harm others even when it brings
substantial harm to oneself should be a good proxy for the recklessness
component of undeterrability. In short, those who are willing to choose ex-
tremely serious crime over freedom might also be said to forfeit their right
to be punished, regardless of how we evaluate their "volitionality" or "ra-
tionality."
Consider in this regard those who executed the attack on the World
Trade Center. They were probably not insane. But they were undeterrable,
in that they preferred crime to life itself. The same might be said of Mous-
saoui, the alleged "twentieth hijacker.""2 ° Moussaoui has declared himself a
"slave of Allah," who prays for the destruction of the United States and
wants to "fight against the evil force of the federal government." '' In court
papers filed in March 2003, Moussaoui stated "I will be delighted to come
back one day to blow myself into your new W.T.C. if ever you rebuild it."
°2
That people like Moussaoui are committed to ending innocent lives in dis-
regard of international legal principles and any threat to their own life dis-
tinguishes them from the "deterrable" common criminal. 23
198 See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
199 We also cannot be sure that a person lacks rationality or any of the other placeholders for this
concept. See supra note 173 and text accompanying notes 177-79.
200 See supra text accompanying note 3.
201 Gibeaut, supra note 114, at 38.
202 Philip Shenon, Man Charged in Sept. 11 Attacks Demands that Qaeda Leaders Testify, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at B12.
203 Given the fact that Moussaoui was charged with conspiracy, supra note 6, one might wonder
what value the additional authority to detain him preventively might have for the State. If the prosecu-
tion fails because the government cannot show the agreement necessary for conspiracy, preventive de-
tention should be barred as well, on legality grounds. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
However, if legality concerns are not present, double jeopardy would not bar a subsequent attempt to
detain Moussaoui preventively. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) ("[A]s commitment
under the Act is not tantamount to 'punishment,' Hendricks' involuntary detention does not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause."). If, instead, Moussaoui is convicted, he may receive the death penalty. See
Novak, supra note 6, at 32-33 (reporting that the trial judge has prohibited the government from seeking
the death penalty because it has denied Moussaoui access to witnesses, but noting that the ruling is being
appealed and that the case could still be transferred to a military tribunal where the death penalty could
be sought). But if someone like Moussaoui is sentenced to something short of a life sentence, he could
be preventively detained after his sentence is completed, if the undeterrability and prediction criteria are
met. Finally, in future cases like Moussaoui's, the government could proceed with preventive detention
in lieu of punishment, although I would argue that option should not be available. See supra note 197.
Another issue raised by cases like Moussaoui's is how preventive detention principles relate to pris-
oner-of-war principles. Clearly enemy combatants may be preventively detained. Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942). That outcome is consistent with the principles developed in this Article. First, enemy
combatants are both dangerous and undeterrable, given their orders. Second, their preventive detention
does not raise dehumanization concerns, because the danger they pose stems solely from the existence of
war conditions, not from explicit or implicit assumptions about their psychological condition.
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D. Summary
Undeterrability, as I have defined it, is the characteristic tendency to be
"unaffected by the prospect of punishment. ' 204  It comes in two forms. 25
Undeterrability through mistake bears a close resemblance to the cognitive
insanity tests. It identifies those individuals who are characteristically un-
aware of the prospect of punishment for contemplated anti-social action be-
cause they misperceive its anti-social nature. Undeterrability through
recklessness essentially restates the traditional policeman-at-the-elbow test,
without the mental illness predicate. It identifies those who would choose
crime despite the high likelihood of a significant loss of freedom or death if
the crime were committed and includes both those who act for their own
ends and for the ends of others.
The undeterrability predicate for preventive detention is fully consis-
tent with the view that punishment is necessary to show respect for those
who commit crime. While most wrongdoers can be said to possess the
"right" to punishment, that right can justifiably be denied to the subset of
wrongdoers who lack autonomy or who will choose the bad regardless of
the consequences. The mistake and recklessness components of undeterra-
bility capture precisely these two concerns. Although subjecting these peo-
ple to preventive detention in lieu of or in addition to criminal punishment
may treat them as less than human, that treatment is justified by their dem-
onstrated inability or unwillingness to make the right choice.
The undeterrability formulation is also superior to the "gap-filler" justi-
fication that is sometimes advanced in support of preventive detention. As
expressed by Professor Schulhofer, °6 this justification exists "when the
state has a compelling interest that cannot be met through the criminal proc-
ess."207 His preeminent example of gap-filling through preventive detention
is the commitment of people with serious mental illness, who cannot be
punished and thus who could harm society in the absence of such commit-
204 This is the language used by the student authors of the Harvard Law Review note that remains
one of the best treatments of the state's authority to commit its citizens. Developments in the Law, su-
pra note 5, at 1233.
205 In Crane, Kansas argued that commitment under the sexual predator law should be permissible
whether based on "volitional" or "emotional" impairment. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002).
As noted earlier, supra note 150, the Court declined to address "whether confinement based solely on
,emotional' abnormality would be constitutional." Id. at 415. This Article argues that it should be, as-
suming "emotional abnormality" is coextensive with the mistake category of undeterrability.
206 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Dis-
tinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69
(1996); see also Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Bounda-
ries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 160 (1996) (advocating a "principle of criminal
interstitiality" that states that "[t]he state may use civil commitment to deprive a person of liberty only
when that person's mental disorder situates the state's compelling interests in the interstices of the crimi-
nal law").
207 Schulhofer, supra note 206, at 87.
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ment. °' But this type of thumb-in-the-dike justification proves too much.
For it would also permit commitment of any dangerous felon who has
served his sentence and can no longer be confined through the criminal
process, something Schulhofer clearly does not endorse.2"9 The undeterra-
bility criterion better describes the "gap" population that cannot be ad-
dressed by the criminal law-those people who are impervious to its
dictates.
As noted earlier, this undeterrability formulation of the psychological
criterion for preventive detention is narrower than the Court's inability-to-
control criterion and broader than the insanity formulation. It would sig-
nificantly limit the types of offenders who could be committed under sexual
predator statutes because most are neither mistaken about the criminality of
their actions nor willing to flaunt them brazenly. For the same reason, it
might reduce the number of people subject to police power commitment
under traditional civil commitment laws, which normally define mental dis-
order relatively expansively, as a "substantial disorder of the person's emo-
tional processes, thought or cognition which grossly impairs judgment,
behavior or capacity to recognize reality. 210 At the same time, because of
the ubiquity of this latter definition, most of these traditional civil commit-
ment laws do not permit commitment of non-mentally ill people who are
undeterrable in the recklessness sense, a small group likely to be comprised
of sex offenders, psychopaths, and terrorists; in fact, some statutes ex-
pressly preclude commitment of individuals who exhibit only personality
disorders .2 1 The concern behind these limitations may be that these latter
individuals do not belong in a mental hospital. That concern is understand-
able. But the state should not be precluded from preventively detaining
truly undeterrable individuals in some type of facility, if they meet the pre-
diction criterion.
III. THE PREDICTION CRITERION
Debate over the degree of dangerousness the state must prove before it
may preventively detain an individual has been heated. Representative is an
exchange between Professor Alexander Brooks and Professor John LaFond.
Professor Brooks stated that even if the risk of violent recidivism is only 50
percent, preventive detention is permissible, because "[a] mistaken decision
208 Id. at 96 ("The civil commitment power is an essential weapon in society's arsenal of social pro-
tection measures, and it must remain available to permit incapacitation of dangerous individuals ... ").
209 Id. at 94-96 (arguing against commitment of sexual predators who are not seriously mentally
ill). Schulhofer also makes clear that he would impose a second limitation on preventive detention, be-
yond the gap-filler rationale: it should only be applied to those wrongdoers who are not autonomous.
Id. at 90-91. But then the gap-filler rationale becomes a redundancy and should not be advanced at all,
given its above-described potential for abuse.
210 See generally MELTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 307 (describing definition of mental disorder
under state civil commitment statutes).
211 Id. at 307-08.
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to confine, however painful to the offender involved, is ... simply not mor-
ally equivalent to a mistaken decision to release .... One is much less
harmful than the other. '21 2 Professor LaFond responded:
Suddenly, the fundamental assumption of American criminal justice that it "is
far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free" has been
transformed into a first principle worthy of George Orwell's 1984. Now, ac-
cording to Professor Brooks, it is far better that at least half, and maybe more,
of the people confined to a psychiatric prison indefinitely be harmless in order
to "incapacitate" those who may commit a future crime. Even better, why not
convert our criminal sentencing system into a game of chance? Release from
prison could be decided by a flip of a coin. At least this lottery will be more
accurate than the one Professor Brooks embraces."13
If the psychological criterion for preventive detention is undeterrabil-
ity, defined as a characteristic ignorance that one's criminal activity is
criminal or a characteristic willingness to commit crime despite certain and
significant punishment or a high risk of death, then the individual's danger-
ousness will often seem evident. However, whether the person with such
characteristic beliefs or desires will translate them into action still requires
prediction. Various psychological and situational variables, including the
strength of the beliefs or desires, the availability of targets, and the effect of
constraints other than liberty deprivation must be considered.214 If the psy-
chological criterion is defined more broadly, as with the Court's inability-
to-control formulation, then dangerousness is even less apparent, and false
positives are more likely. 15 Finally, in many situations (e.g., stop and frisk,
pretrial detention, sentencing), no psychological criterion is or should be
required. In these latter situations, the prediction may be even more vulner-
able to attack.
In the following discussion I do not reach definitive conclusions as to
how likely the risk of anti-social conduct must be before preventive deten-
tion in all of its variations is permitted. I do propose two principles for
guiding debate on this issue, however. The first is the proportionality prin-
ciple, which states that the degree of dangerousness required for preventive
detention should be roughly proportionate to the degree of liberty depriva-
212 Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual
Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 753 (1992).
213 LaFond, supra note 64, at 698-99.
214 See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 31, at 115 (indicating that dangerousness evaluation must con-
sider sources of future stress, whether contexts in which violence occurred in the past will reoccur, the
likely victims of violence and their availability, and the means the person possesses to commit violence).
215 People with serious mental disorders are no more likely to recidivate than other offenders. See
James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Of-
fenders: A Meta-Analysis, in PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 139 (1998) (concluding that major predictors for vio-
lent recidivism were same for mentally disordered offenders as for nondisordered offenders; clinical or
psychopathological variables were either unrelated to recidivism or negatively related). Thus, a broad
psychological criterion wil not facilitate the predictive process.
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tion the state seeks. The second is the consistency principle, which states
that the degree of dangerousness required for preventive detention should
be similar to the degree of dangerousness sufficient to authorize like liberty
deprivations associated with other manifestations of the state's police
power, in particular criminal dispositions.
A. The Proportionality Principle
Government interventions based explicitly on dangerousness vary
enormously both in nature and duration. Commitment as a sexual predator
involves confinement in a prison-like setting"6 that is renewable periodi-
cally and that will often also be long-term; indeed, it may amount to a life-
time disposition, given the relative untreatability of some of these
offenders.217 Pretrial preventive detention of suspects occurs in jail, and is
limited by speedy trial laws, but can still easily last for 100 days even when
the defendant pushes for trial.2"' Typical civil commitment of those with se-
rious mental illness occurs in a less confining institution and is both much
shorter, on average, than either sexual predator commitment or pretrial de-
tention and much less likely to be renewed, primarily because treatment is
more efficacious at reducing the danger."9 Police stops occur in a public
setting and should last no longer than fifteen or twenty minutes.220
Generally, the law requires a lesser showing of dangerousness as one
moves down this hierarchy of interventions. Sexual predator statutes usu-
ally require proof beyond a reasonable doubt,22" ' pretrial detentions require
proof by clear and convincing evidence or some similar standard,222 civil
216 For instance, persons in the Illinois sex offender program are housed in a wing of the maximum-
security prison complex. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986).
217 In Minnesota, which has had a statute similar to Kansas's since 1939, "[n]ot one person commit-
ted since 1975 has been discharged from a final sex offender commitment," although one was provision-
ally discharged and five others were put in state nursing homes. Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual
Violence. Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J.
157, 206 (1996). As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 49-62, preventive detention gov-
erned by Jackson would not function this way. Nonetheless, even under a well-run preventive regime
some sexual offenders would stay incarcerated for a very long period unless other limitations, such as
those discussed herein, are imposed.
218 Under the federal Speedy Trial Act, for instance, trial need not start until 100 days after arrest,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b), (c)(l) (2000), and delays are quite common. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9)
(2000) (listing exemptions to speedy trial requirement).
219 The average length of stay for acutely ill patients is probably less than two weeks, although
"chronic" patients may spend months or years in the hospital. See PINELLAS COUNTY ACUTE SERVICES:
MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE EMERGENCIES (February 27, 2002) (on file with author)
(showing average length of hospital stay in nine community inpatient units ranging from 4.3 to 10 days).
220 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (upholding a twenty-minute stop, but suggest-
ing this length was permissible only because suspect was responsible for its duration).
221 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2002).
222 See, e.g., Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000) (pretrial detention on
dangerousness ground authorized if judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure.., the safety of any other person and the commu-
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commitment also requires clear and convincing evidence, 223 short-term (e.g.,
48-hour) commitment pending the commitment proceeding may be based
on probable cause,224 and police investigative stops require reasonable sus-
picion.225 In general, this proportionality approach is sensible. 26 It hides
two important problems, however.
The first has to do with the interaction of the standard of proof and the
definition of dangerousness. One might think that proof of dangerousness
beyond a reasonable doubt requires a showing that the individual is ex-
tremely likely to engage in crime if not detained. Some statutes define dan-
gerousness in less absolute terms, however, speaking instead of whether the
person is "likely to" engage in anti-social conduct.2 This definition has the
effect of lowering the state's burden, because it only requires that the gov-
ernment demonstrate by the requisite standard (beyond a reasonable doubt,
clear and convincing evidence, etc.) that the person is likely to offend.228
An analogous approach, made popular with the advent of actuarial ap-
proaches to prediction, is to label a person "dangerous" if the state can show
by the relevant standard of proof that the person belongs to a particular
group for whom a specific likelihood of risk can be identified, even if that
likelihood is relatively lOW. 229 Both of these moves are sleights of hand to
the extent they purport to require a high level of proof that the person will
offend.
nity"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041 (4)(c)(5) (West 2002) (requiring "substantial probability... [t]hat the
defendant poses the threat of harm to the community").
223 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
224 Actually, most states do not specify a standard of proof in these circumstances. See REISNER ET
AL., supra note 88, at 736. But see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 2003) (emergency deten-
tion requires a finding of probable cause that person is mentally disordered and, as a result, dangerous to
others).
225 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
226 Cf. McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972) (substantive and procedural
limitations on commitment increase as the length of commitment increases). I have argued for the same
approach in analogous circumstances when interpreting the Fourth Amendment reasonableness require-
ment. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1, 68-75
(1991); Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality
Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1053 (1998).
227 Cf. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.705 (2002) ("likely to cause serious harm to ... others"); 405 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/1-119 (1999) ("reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon... another in
the near future"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 1 (Law. Co-op 1989) ("a substantial risk of physical
harm to other persons").
228 This observation was first made in John Monahan & David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof
and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 37 (1978).
229 See, e.g., John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admis-
sibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 910 (2000) ("As the field has moved in a more actuarial direc-
tion, professional consensus has shifted from the question of 'how accurate are clinicians in general at
predicting violence' to 'how valid are specific risk factors, or specific combinations of risk factors, for
assessing violence risk'?"). Legal scholars have accepted the same reasoning. See Corrado, supra note
18, at 792 (arguing that even when risk is low, if the detained person belongs to the designated risk
group, "there is a one hundred percent chance that person presents a risk of harm").
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The second problem with the hierarchical approach to proof of danger-
ousness is that the hierarchy itself is not as clear as it seems at first glance.
I have assumed, for instance, that commitment of sexual predators is longer
than typical civil commitment. Yet some individuals subjected to civil
commitment are as resistant to treatment as the "incorrigible" sex offender
is.23 Some sex offenders, in contrast, may be rendered less dangerous
through chemical treatments or cognitive therapy programs."' To a very
large extent, in other words, the length of confinement depends, or at least
should depend, on the individual rather than the state or a statutory provi-
sion. Thus, the standard of proof the state must meet should not be based
solely or even predominantly on the type of commitment, but should in-
stead depend primarily on its length.
This conclusion has important implications for the scope of preventive
detention. Although each new commitment at the periodic review need not
be preceded by a new anti-social act (both because, if effective, the inter-
vention should prevent such acts, and because the justification for preven-
tive detention is dangerousness, not behavior), it should be permitted only
upon increasingly more stringent proof of dangerousness, whether the set-
ting is criminal or civil commitment. Evidence of resistance to treatment,
recent overt acts, and other new indicia of dangerousness can meet this bur-
den under some circumstances. At some point, however, release should be
required simply because the requisite certainty level demanded by the pro-
portionality principle has become so high it cannot be met by any type of
evidence. That proposition might require, for instance, automatic release
after a certain period unless new evidence of dangerousness is forthcom-
ing. 232
Another important implication of this reasoning concerns sentencing.
Dangerousness is no longer a major consideration under most sentencing
230 For instance, some psychoses are particularly resistant to treatment. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 298-99 (4th ed. 1994) (describing delu-
sional disorder, persecutory type-a condition in which the person feels "conspired against[,] resentful
and angry" and which can lead the person to "resort to violence against those they believe are hurting
them"-as "chronic" and having relatively poor prognosis).
231 Judith V. Becker & William D. Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know About Assessing and
Treating Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 116, 127-31 (1998) (discussing biological and
cognitive therapies and their efficacy).
232 1 have made a similar suggestion in the context of juvenile justice. See Slobogin et al., supra
note 55, at 210. There I suggested that a durational limit has three other advantages:
First, of course, it minimizes the harm caused by an erroneous prediction. Second, a time limit
known to the offender avoids the demoralization that can occur in an indeterminate regime. Third,
such a limit can have a positive therapeutic effect because it gives the [individual] a specific be-
havioral goal to achieve (that is, no antisocial activity within the specified period in order to obtain
release).
Id. The time limit need not, and probably should not, be tied to the sentence associated with the trigger-
ing crime, but it may have a similar effect; the theory would be that, had the prediction that led to pre-
ventive detention been correct, the crime would have been committed and the person subject to a
sentence, at the end of which the state would release him.
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schemes and is considered irrelevant in many (at least in theory). 233 How-
ever, when dangerousness is a legitimate sentencing criterion, as in inde-
terminate sentencing regimes, the proportionality principle should apply in
this setting as well. In light of the liberty deprivation to which prisoners are
subjected, that means that a relatively high degree of dangerousness must
be proven before a sentence may be imposed, and that, as with commit-
ment, release should be required after a certain period of time, unless the
state can demonstrate a new basis for a dangerousness finding or the sen-
tence is based on additional considerations such as deterrence or just des-
sert. On the same ground, the death penalty should never be based on a
finding of dangerousness,234 unless the prediction can be made with virtual
certainty.
B. The Consistency Principle
The consistency principle works in tandem with the proportionality
principle. The proportionality principle provides a method of graduating
the prediction criterion, through assessment of the nature and length of the
preventive detention. The consistency principle provides a baseline for the
prediction criterion, through assessment of the proof required to sanction
other government interventions based on dangerousness.
The most obvious place such intervention occurs is in the criminal jus-
tice system where, either explicitly or implicitly, assumptions about dan-
gerousness are pervasive. Thus, application of the consistency principle
would require that the prediction criterion for preventive detention conform
to the prediction criterion in criminal law provisions that contemplate lib-
erty deprivations. In making this inquiry, consistency analysis would look
solely at comparisons with crimes that do not require proof of any particular
harm, for once harm occurs other considerations besides dangerousness
come into play.235 The somewhat surprising outcome of this way of think-
233 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 70, at 3-14 (arguing that, despite the just deserts and deter-
rence focus of the reforms that led to the determinate sentencing that predominates today, restraint to
prevent future crime has been the overriding goal of public policy).
234 At least five states make dangerousness an aggravating factor in capital cases. 2003 Idaho Sess.
Laws ch. 19, §§ 2515(9)(h), (g)(8); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (2002); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4C (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.070 (West 2002).
235 Of course, dangerousness can play a role in defining result crimes as well. For instance, Justice
Holmes believed that "the test of murder is the degree of danger to life attending the act under the
known circumstances of the case" and proceeded to illustrate this point by asserting that a workman who
killed someone by throwing a stone off a roof should be guilty of murder, unless he first shouts a loud
warning, in which case he should only be convicted of manslaughter. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 48-51 (1881). At the same time, Holmes does not suggest that, had no harm occurred in
these cases, the penalty should be the same as when death occurs, despite the fact that the "danger"
would appear to be the same. Presumably, something besides dangerousness explains this conclusion.
Cf Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law: A Study in Legislative Deception?,
5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299 (1994) (exploring the debate between "objectivists" who believe harm
98:1 (2003)
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ing about the prediction criterion is that preventive detention might be justi-
fiable, at least as an initial matter, upon a minimal showing of risk.
Among the most conspicuous illustrations of crimes that do not require
harm but that do incorporate a risk assessment are the classic "inchoate
crimes," attempt and conspiracy. These offenses do not occur unless there
is sufficient conduct to show the ultimate harm is likely to be committed.
For attempt, as noted earlier, mere preparation is insufficient and something
akin to "dangerous proximity" to the completed act is often required.236 For
conspiracy, an agreement and, in many jurisdictions, an overt act in further-
ance of the agreement, are required.237 More importantly, the government
must show the alleged attempter or conspirator intended to carry out the
criminal act; mere awareness that the act will occur is usually insufficient.238
In combined effect, these actus reus and mens rea requirements mean that,
to obtain conviction, the state must show the act would have occurred had it
not been for the incompetence of the perpetrator or the competence of law
enforcement. In short, proof of a high degree of danger is incorporated into
the definition of inchoate crimes.239
If attempt and conspiracy were the only crimes based on a dangerous-
ness assessment, endorsement of the consistency principle might require a
very high likelihood of harm before preventive confinement could occur.
But these inchoate offenses are not alone. Other non-result crimes, which
might be called "anticipatory" offenses, allow conviction upon proof of a
much lower risk of harm.
Consider first vagrancy statutes. Older versions of these statutes per-
mitted conviction based on acts such as a refusal to identify oneself or
standing on a street comer with no apparent purpose, acts which have only
is the principal focus of criminal law and "subjectivists" who believe that evilness is the principal focus
and noting that, despite the supposed triumph of the latter point of view in some modem codes, harm
still plays a major role in crime definition). Given the complicated and ambiguous role of dangerous-
ness in connection with completed crimes, this Article focuses solely on those crimes where the danger-
ousness requirement is more explicit.
236 See supra note 116. See also RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 225-29 (1997) (re-
viewing the various conduct formulations for attempt and noting that the proximity tests require that the
person come "dangerously close to accomplishing the harm ultimately feared," while the res ipsa loqui-
tur test requires more of a prediction, and the Model Penal Code test requires that the conduct be
"strongly corroborative of criminal purpose" but still beyond "mere preparation").
237 LAFAVE, supra note 114, at 574-79 (conspiracy usually requires "an agreement between two or
more persons" and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy).
238 Id. at 540 (attempt); id. at 567 (conspiracy).
239 A retributivist might say that these actions are criminalized solely on the ground that the actor's
decision to engage in anti-social or risky conduct demonstrates sufficient blameworthiness. See, e.g.,
Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1170 (1997) (arguing that purpose is the appropriate mens rea for inchoate crimes
because the formation of such purpose is itself a culpable act, not because it demonstrates dangerous-
ness). Even so, the backward-looking retributive judgment cannot be made without an assessment of the
harm or risk occasioned by the decision, either from an objective standpoint or as perceived by the actor.
For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 256-57.
HeinOnline  -- 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54 2003-2004
A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness
a tenuous relationship to public harm of any sort.240  For related reasons,
these laws have usually been found invalid on vagueness grounds.24' How-
ever, newer versions of these statutes, which prohibit conduct such as loiter-
ing within 30 feet of a cash machine or congregating in areas known for
drug-trafficking, have withstood such challenges even when a mens rea re-
quirement is absent, perhaps because they are more obviously associated
with a real public menace.242 Even so, that association is usually trivial; cer-
tainly, the chance that any person standing near a cash machine or in a high
crime area will cause serious harm to others is negligible. 43
Even more explicit in their reliance on suspect dangerousness assess-
ments are endangerment laws. Here too the degree of dangerousness re-
quired does not approach that required for attempt or conspiracy. Under the
Model Penal Code, as noted earlier, a person commits a misdemeanor if he
"recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury. '' 2' The words "may place.., in
danger" contemplate a less-than-rigorous standard of proof with respect to
risk.245 Along the same lines is the popular crime of driving while intoxi-
cated.246 The chance that a drunk driver will actually kill or hurt someone is
fairly low. Once again, the dangerousness requirement inherent in this type
of crime is minimal.
A final type of anticipatory offense is possession, a crime that comes in
many varieties. In most states, for instance, it is a crime to possess burglary
tools and, in some jurisdictions, this offense occurs even if the only items
possessed are more likely to be used innocently than criminally, such as
240 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 n.l (1983) (ruling a statute void on vagueness
grounds that penalized any person "who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place with-
out apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence
when requested by any peace officer to do so"); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (holding void
for vagueness an ordinance that penalized anyone who is a member of a "criminal street gang," who re-
mains in one place "with no apparent purpose," and who refuses to disperse after being ordered to do so
by a police officer).
241 See supra note 240.
242 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Com-
munities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 622-24 (1997).
243 The "danger" these statutes are trying to prevent appears to be deterioration in the quality of life.
See GARLAND, supra note 140, at 181 (although "no one in particular is harmed by the conduct in ques-
tion, this does not prevent the invocation of a collective victim-'the community' and its 'quality of
life'-that is deemed to suffer the ill-effects that must always flow from prohibited behaviour, however
trivial"). Until "damage to the quality of life" is made a crime, however (and the legality principle
should prevent that), the danger prevented by these laws is so diffuse as to be non-existent, unless they
also require proof of intent to do harm to person or property, as some of them do. See Livingston, supra
note 242, at 622 n.337.
244 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962).
245 Cf Payne v. State, 7 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tenn. 1999) (noting that the Model Penal Code's formula-
tion of reckless endangerment "supports a broad interpretation" that a "mere possibility" of danger is
sufficient for conviction).
246 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193 (West 2002).
98:1 (2003)
HeinOnline  -- 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 55 2003-2004
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
crowbars and screwdrivers. 47 In contrast to inchoate offenses such as at-
tempt and conspiracy, conviction for this type of crime does not require
proof of intent to commit any particular harm, but rather only knowing pos-
session under "suspicious" circumstances. 48 Similarly, in simple drug pos-
session cases, the prosecution often only needs to show knowing possession
(and sometimes not even that); it never needs to show that the perpetrator's
possession of the drug will cause some identifiable harm.249 In gun posses-
sion cases, conviction is usually automatic if the possessor is a felon or an
alien, or does not have a license; in none of these three situations is "good
moral character" or something analogous a defense.25 ° All of these crimes
are based on explicit or implicit dangerousness assessments, and none re-
quire demonstration of a high degree of danger. Indeed, with respect to
possession of a small amount of drugs and possession of a gun without a li-
cense, one is hard put to identify what third party interests the state is at-
tempting to protect.2
51
In short, a large number of crimes not only do not require proof of any
harm, but are based on very weak predictions of harm. That suggests that if
the state's police power were to be consistently instituted, initial preventive
detention could justifiably be based on very weak predictions as well. A
closer look at these anticipatory crimes suggests a more nuanced conclu-
sion, but ultimately also suggests that this general statement is correct.
Anticipatory crimes seem to fall into one of three categories, illustrated
by the three types of offenses just described. The first category-
exemplified by vagrancy laws---carries trivial penalties.252 If this were the
only baseline, application of the consistency principle might lead to the
247 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 466 (West 2002) (defining crowbars and screwdrivers as burglars'
tools); see also Dotson v. State, 260 So.2d 839 (Miss. 1972) (conviction for possession of screwdriver
and a large bolt); People v. Diaz, 244 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 1969) (screwdriver wrapped in newspaper).
248 Markus Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 859 (2001) (describing the mens rea element of possession offenses and
concluding that "many possession statutes, particularly in the drug area.., are so-called strict liability
crimes").
249 Id. at 860 ("Simple possession itself can, but need not, require proof of actual or constructive
awareness .... ").
250 Id. at 926.
251 Recent television advertisements suggest that drug possession crimes harm those who are killed
and assaulted by the cartels that grow and distribute the drugs. Of course, the cartels would not exist if
drug use were legal or regulated differently. In any event, the causative link between possession of a
small amount of marijuana and a killing in Columbia is tenuous at best.
252 The typical vagrancy statute is a misdemeanor and usually results simply in removal from the
area, sometimes via a night in jail. For instance, the detainee in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 32 (1983),
was stopped for loitering 15 times in two years, but was apparently never put in jail. Id. at 32. Under
the Model Penal Code, loitering is a "violation," MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (1962), which "does not
constitute a crime," may not result in incarceration, and "shall not give rise to any disability or legal
disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal charge," id. § 1.04(5).
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conclusion that the government should not have the option of preventively
depriving people of liberty when the risk of it occurring is low.
But that conclusion fails to take into account the second and third cate-
gories of anticipatory crimes. The second group of such offenses-
exemplified by drunk driving and reckless endangerment-is more likely to
bring significant incarceration,253 even though it too may be associated with
minimal risk. Thus, application of the consistency principle might permit
preventive detention in similar low risk situations. At the same time, what
distinguishes this second category of anticipatory offenses is that it is aimed
at avoiding significant, imminent harm. That suggests, under consistency
reasoning, that low risk individuals may be preventively confined only
when the harm feared is very serious and near at hand, two elements that,
together, place substantial limitations on the threshold for intervention." 4
Still left to consider, however, is the third category of anticipatory
crimes. Illustrated by possession crimes, it can lead to significant sen-
tences,"' even though the feared harm is unlikely to occur and is neither
imminent nor serious. Under the consistency principle, this suggests that, at
least initially, preventive detention can be based on a showing of moderate
or even minimal risk regardless of the nature of the harm threatened. Only
as the confinement becomes prolonged would the proportionality principle
require proof of a high level of danger.
A retributivist might argue that using the level of dangerousness inher-
ent in criminal statutes as a baseline for preventive detention in the manner
just described is nonsensical, because crimes are by definition backward-
looking assessments. When defining crime, the retributivist may contend,
the focal point of the inquiry is culpability, not the degree of dangerousness
inherent in particular acts.256 As a result, the fact that certain anticipatory
crimes might not require a high level of dangerousness is not a pertinent in-
253 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193 (West 2002) (providing for imprisonment of not more than
six months after first drunk driving offense); MODEL PENAL CODE. §§ 211.2; 1.04(3), (4) (1962) (provid-
ing that reckless endangerment is a misdemeanor, which generally can result in imprisonment of up to
one year).
254 Alexander Brooks proposed that dangerousness be broken down into "four component elements:
(1) magnitude of harm; (2) probability that harm will occur; (3) frequency with which the harm will oc-
cur; and (4) imminence of harm." ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM 680-82 (1974). He then noted that:
A person can be characterized as 'dangerous' or not, depending on a balancing of these four com-
ponents. For example a harm which is not likely to occur, but which is very serious, may add up
to 'dangerousness.' By the same token, a relatively trivial harm which is highly likely to occur
with great frequency might also add up to dangerousness. On the other hand, a trivial harm, even
though it is likely to occur, might not add up to dangerousness.
Id. at 680.
255 Dubber, supra note 248, at 859 ("New York boasts no fewer than 115 felony possession of-
fenses, all of which require a minimum of one year in prison; eleven of them provide for a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment.").
256 See supra note 239.
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dicator of the state's police power interest. The only important factor is
whether the perpetrator recognizes, or should recognize, the danger that
does exist or, under the most subjective approaches, whether the perpetrator
thinks the danger exists, regardless of whether it actually does.
The problem with the retributivist argument is that, under any of the
anticipatory crimes just discussed, subjective awareness of the degree of
risk is virtually or entirely irrelevant. A person will be convicted of gun or
drug possession, drunk driving, or vagrancy if he meets the act requirement,
regardless of whether he was aware of the risk he created (or lack thereof).
Even in a reckless endangerment prosecution, where awareness of risk is
relevant, the degree of risk actually created is likely to play a much more
significant role than the risk perceived by the actor."' The gravamen of
these crimes is not what the person thought, but the objective risk posed. In
many cases, that risk is not very high, and in some it is non-existent, but the
state exerts its police power anyway.
A second argument against adopting the consistency principle is based
on the practicality that crimes must be defined legislatively. Given this
fact, one might contend, we must allow prosecution and conviction of peo-
ple who do not cause any identifiable harm and are not obviously dangerous
(e.g., the harmless vagrant or gun owner) to ensure that we also nab the
really dangerous loiterer or weapons possessor; criminalizing the behavior
of the first group is the inevitable consequence of a preference for general-
ized, before-the-fact rule-making. In the preventive detention context, on
the other hand, we are able to individualize the dangerousness assessment,
and thus we should do so, despite the likelihood that we will end up requir-
ing greater proof of danger than we do in analogous criminal adjudications.
To my mind, this is not an argument against the consistency principle, but
rather an indictment of how we think about defining crime.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL LAW
The logic of the consistency principle does not dictate that the degree
of risk required for preventive detention correlate with the currently low
levels associated with many anticipatory crimes. It could just as easily be
used to reform crime definition. Because preventive detention forthrightly
and conspicuously bases liberty deprivation on predictions of dangerous-
ness, courts have traditionally required the government to demonstrate a
high degree of risk in that setting. In contrast, as just discussed, the crimi-
nal law blithely permits conviction and punishment of individuals who have
caused no harm and are not very dangerous. Perhaps that should change.
257 The typical endangerment statute requires that the danger be real, not merely perceived. See,
e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103 (1997) (requiring that the victim be placed "in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-63 (2001) (requiring "a risk of serious physi-
cal injury to another person").
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Putting this point another way, a proactive use of the consistency prin-
ciple might help deal with the overcriminalization phenomenon that has up-
set many commentators. 258  Two recent papers highlight the more or less
constant proliferation of suspect criminal statutes over the past century.
William Stuntz, in an article describing the "pathological" institutional rela-
tionship between legislatures, prosecutors, and courts, argues that "the story
of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between prosecu-
tors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes,
and growing marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for nar-
rower liability rules rather than broader ones. 259 Spurred by the perceived
need to keep prosecutors as well as constituents happy, legislators have
added easy-to-prove crimes (e.g., possession, endangerment, and three
strikes laws) to those that are harder to establish (e.g., use and harm-
creation laws). 26" That in turn has simplified prosecutors' jobs, making
guilty pleas, multiple charge indictments, and harsh sentences easier to ob-
tain.261 Judicial deference to these developments, demonstrated by an un-
willingness to use vagueness doctrine and other due process constraints to
strike down duly enacted legislation, 262 has left prosecutors in control of
who gets convicted and for how long, with often discriminatory results, es-
pecially in terms of class and race.263
Markus Dubber has been even more critical of the criminalization phe-
nomenon. He excoriates the "depersonalization" of the criminal law that
has occurred through the passage of criminal provisions that carry minimal
act and mens rea requirements (again, his principal example is posses-
sion). 2' 4 To him, these laws not only are victimless, they are often offender-
less, in the sense that the mere proximity of a drug or gun to the alleged
offender is enough to merit conviction; no affirmative act is required, and
mens rea is often presumed if the person is found near the contraband
item. 26" Dubber suggests that for crimes such as unlicensed gun possession,
258 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999) (arguing that harmless wrongdoing is now routinely criminalized); Sanford
H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 157 (1967).
259 William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of the Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,510 (2001).
260 Id. at 529-33.
261 Id. at 533-38.
262 Id. at 542 ("[I]f two competing interpretations of criminal statutes are at issue, and one is much
more likely to attract hostile legislative attention than the other.., appellate judges will tend to avoid
conflict and follow the (perceived) legislative will.").
263 Id. at 575-76 (noting that in enforcement of possession laws, "class-based, and hence to some
degree race-based, enforcement remains common.... Perhaps one reason support for drug criminaliza-
tion remains so high-and surely one reason why the scope of drug criminalization remains so broad-
lies in legislatures' ability to prohibit without fear that prohibition will be applied equally everywhere.").
264 Dubber, supra note 248, at 934 ("By reducing everyone to a potential threat to the state, posses-
sion offenses are symptomatic of an apersonal regime of criminal administration in which persons have
a role only as sources of inconvenience, as nuisances to be abated, as objects of regulation.").
265 Id. at 908 (defining possession crime as "an offense designed and applied to remove dangerous in-
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possession of drugs or vagrancy, the real offense is "disobedience" to the
state, not any threat to its citizens, 66 an offense for which only the politi-
cally powerless are likely to be prosecuted.267
Stuntz despairs of any significant solution to overcriminalization that
involves either curbing prosecutorial discretion or depoliticizing the legisla-
tive process. 68 Two of his own solutions, ensuring functional notice of
crimes and repealing unenforced laws,269 are similarly unlikely to have any
major impact on the problem. 7 But he also proposes that judges, under the
aegis of due process analysis, be authorized to second-guess prosecutorial
decisions. Thus, he is willing to countenance judicial inquiries into whether
marijuana possession merits jail time, whether certain types of fraud are
really harmful, and whether any particular sentence is unduly harsh, as
counterpoints to prosecutorial attempts to encourage guilty pleas through
charging trivial crimes or stacking charges.27' Stuntz's justification for this
admittedly radical proposal is that judicial authority to nullify should be as
broad as the jury's.272
Dubber wants change that is even more fundamental. While Stuntz does
not believe that legislatures can be coaxed into changing their practices of in-
creasing and broadening the scope of the criminal law, Dubber is more opti-
mistic. He wants legislatures to adhere to rigorous actus reus and mens rea
requirements that make crimes only out of intentional or reckless conduct that
harms or is highly like to harm real (as opposed to hypothetical) people. 73
dividuals even before they have had an opportunity to manifest their dangerousness in an ordinary inchoate
offense").
266 Id. at 926 (noting the current law of possession suggests that "the core of the possession offense
is not the prevention of harm, but the chastisement of disobedience").
267 Id. at 918 ("[T]he potential offenders who suffer the incapacitation are predominantly poor
blacks with no political power ... ").
268 Stuntz, supra note 259, at 579 (noting that, of the three possible solutions-limiting prosecuto-
rial discretion, ending legislative monopoly on crime definition, or constitutionalizing criminal law-
only judicial activism "has any chance of working").
269 Id. at 588-94.
270 Reinvigorating Lambert and a functional notice requirement, see supra text accompanying notes 96-
99; 106-08, would not affect very many prosecutions (if only because the government can make sure func-
tional notice is present) and eliminating crimes that have gone unenforced for some time will affect even fewer.
271 Stuntz, supra note 259, at 591-96. Some of these pages contain Stuntz's discussion of disuetude
(the repeal of unused laws), but the way he would use that authority amounts to judicial nullification
based on an assessment of whether the prosecution is pretextual (e.g., a prosecution of a person under an
under-used law who is not likely to harm others but who is a target for some other, illegitimate reason).
272 Id. at 596.
273 According to Dubber, in the course of the "war on crime,"
[t]he two fundamental principles of [the common law], actus reus and mens rea, proved so malle-
able and ungrounded.., that they were easily accommodated to the new demands of emergency
management. The mens rea requirement either simply disappeared, or was easily circumvented
through evidentiary presumptions. The actus reus requirement likewise went quietly, as the con-
cept of act proved flexible enough to provide at least the sheen of legitimacy to the paradigmatic
offense of the war on crime, possession.
Dubber, supra note 248, at 994-95.
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I am sympathetic to both of these efforts. My only contribution to this
commentary is to suggest, very briefly, how the law of preventive detention
might contribute to limitations on the criminalization phenomenon. In
Addington v. Texas,274 the Supreme Court held that the loss of liberty associ-
ated with civil commitment requires clear and convincing evidence of dan-
gerousness. While Addington rejected the reasonable doubt standard as
unnecessarily stringent where non-punitive confinement is concerned,2 75 it
also repudiated the lower preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in
that setting. 76 If the consistency principle is applied proactively, that conclu-
sion should have significant implications for the criminal law. Indeed, in ex-
plaining why the preponderance standard is insufficient for civil commitment,
the Court seemed to presage the concerns that Stuntz and Dubber describe.
The Court noted that "the preponderance standard creates the risk of increas-
ing the number of individuals erroneously committed"2 77 and that "[1]oss of
liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something more
serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior. 2 78 Most importantly,
Addington stated that "[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally
with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is sig-
nificantly greater than any possible harm to the state.
2 79
If civil commitment, which Addington confirms is a less onerous bur-
den on liberty than criminal conviction, requires proof that a person is more
likely than "more-likely-than-not" to cause harm to another, criminal laws
that base liability and incarceration on danger rather than harm should, at
the least, require the same. 8° Judges implementing Stuntz's due process
nullification proposal should demand proof of a high degree of dangerous-
ness from prosecutors pursuing inchoate and anticipatory crimes, or dismiss
charges and reduce sentences. Legislatures following Dubber's recommen-
dations should avoid vagrancy, possession, and endangerment formulations
that do not demand similar proof. Whether implemented judicially or legis-
latively, actus reus elements should require conduct that is clearly risky, and
274 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
275 Id. at 432.
276 Id. at 432-33.
277 Id. at 426.
278 Id. at 427.
279 Id.
280 To the same effect are arguments that society's attempts to commit dangerous individuals are
analogous to an individual's attempts to protect him or herself against danger. Larry Alexander, A Uni-
fied Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1477 (1999) ("Self-defense,
therefore, is preemptive action... analogous to civil commitment of the dangerous, gun control, 'no
contact' orders, preemptive military strikes, and other practices in which the future dangerousness of
others, not their past transgressions, is taken to justify depriving them of life, liberty, or property.");
Randy Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76
B.U. L. REv. 157, 160-61 (1996). Because we require a high degree of danger for self-defense (i.e.,
imminent threat of serious physical harm), we should do the same for those situations in which the state
engages in self-defense, whether it is through anticipatory crimes or civil commitment.
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mens rea elements should likewise require intent to cause harm (as the at-
tempt and conspiracy offenses do) or at least willful blindness to the risk.
That would be the legacy of proactively applying the consistency principle.
CONCLUSION
Preventive detention is a pervasive, routine occurrence in our society.
Its most conspicuous guise may be the relatively new sexual predator laws.
But it is also the key feature of civil commitment and police stops on the
street, as well as a significant component in many criminal sentences and an
intrinsic element of crimes such as possession and endangerment. Given
their ubiquity, courts and lawyers need to pay much more attention to how
and why we justify these deprivations of liberty based on dangerousness.
This Article has explored some of the commonalities and distinctions
between these various exercises of the state's police power in the hopes of
furthering their rational implementation. The jurisprudence of dangerous-
ness it has advanced is based on three significant assertions. The first is
that potential abuses associated with a preventive detention system can be
minimized-or at least reduced to a level no higher than exists in any alter-
native police power regime-through periodic review, rules requiring
treatment and detention in the least restrictive manner feasible, a threshold
requirement of obviously risky conduct, and increasingly heavier burdens
of proof as the detention lengthens. The second assertion is that, while pre-
ventive detention is generally inconsistent with a preference for autonomy
when criminal punishment is an option, it is acceptable both for those who
are unaware of the criminality of their actions and for those who are com-
mitted to crime and are aware that this commitment will very likely mean a
significant loss of freedom or death.
The final assertion underlying the jurisprudence of dangerousness de-
scribed here is that we can predict danger adequately for legal purposes.
That assertion is based in part on improvements in prediction science, but
stems mostly from the belief that we cannot justifiably demand more accu-
racy in the preventive detention setting than we do in the criminal law. This
same idea, however, could also lead to the position that we should demand
more certainty than we currently do in making those predictions sought by
the law of crimes.
These conclusions would require significant change in both the law of
preventive detention and the law of crimes. The scope of Hendricks and
Crane would be cabined, the threshold and conditions of commitment
would need to be revamped, and possession and other anticipatory crimes
would need to be redrafted or at least subjected to more intense judicial
scrutiny. Perhaps most importantly, the law would recognize that a juris-
prudence of dangerousness is an essential aspect of regulating government
power.
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